

Towards a Basque State



citizenship and culture



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TOWARDS A BASQUE STATE

citizenship and culture



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FOREWORD

Ipar Hegoa Fundazioa

One of the goals of the IPAR HEGOA Foundation is to carry out studies and analyses of political and social issues of interest for the Basque Country and to encourage discussion of such subjects. Therefore, at the present time when there is much debate about the viability of Euskal Herria, IPAR HEGOA Fundazioa wishes to contribute to the discussion by offering these documents. Some will argue that Euskal Herria is a tiny country, that fragmentation makes no sense in the present era of globalisation, that what is needed now is for all of us to work together and achieve a mutual understanding, that demands for independence lead to discrimination among the members of a community, and so on, and so forth. Many factors and countless arguments are cited as reasons today for *not* creating new states; some of them are coherent arguments that make a certain amount of sense. And yet, be that as it may, thousands upon thousands of Basque citizens are still insisting that they want a state of their own. What of *their* arguments? Are these not also coherent, equally important arguments?

Whether we like it or not, the fact is that in the world today the state continues to be the chief expression of comprehensive political decision-making power. Therefore, in the contemporary Basque Country, in the current political state of affairs, we believe it is both interesting and necessary to undertake a collective exercise of thinking through the benefits, options, risks and dangers that the construction of a Basque state in Europe would entail, on many levels, including the political, institutional, territorial, socio-economic, linguistic, cultural, and in terms of identity.

The IPAR HEGOA Foundation proposes to take a long look at all the circumstances and ask how feasible a Basque state is. Thus we have brought together on these pages the opinions of numerous academics and researchers who are familiar with this range of subjects. We are well aware that there are many other specialists, besides these, who have often made extremely interesting contributions to the field. IPAR HEGOA Fundazioa has not set itself the task of bringing together contributions from every single such expert, or to present in equal measure current opinions in every discipline, or to represent every single region of our country to the same degree. Instead, priority has been given to achieving a coherent picture subscribed to by a respectable number of experts, even at the risk of leaving some geographical areas, universities or perspectives out of the picture. But this does not mean we have striven to produce a single, monolithic viewpoint: that was not our purpose. Each author was free to give their own opinion, provided only that they focus on the overall idea of the necessity and viability of a Basque state; beyond that, it is recognised that there is room for a variety of points of view.

After all, the aim of the present study was not to create a constitution for the Basque state, nor to lay down rules for what a Basque state ought to be like. Ours is a less ambitious objective, yet quite a crucial one all the same. The question we wish to answer is this: Is a Basque state viable or not? Would it or would it not be worth the effort to create a Basque state? Would Basques be willing to embark on such a project? In the event that these questions find an answer and if that answer is in the affirmative, then, and only then, would it be time for us to turn to the next set of questions, questions about the direction and purpose of such a Basque state.

The IPAR HEGOA Foundation believes that the present study addresses this matter of great interest, and that it is able to play a useful part in bringing Euskal Herria into focus in the present international situation, by gathering together a range of views now current in a variety of disciplines; it may also help to establish the absolute and relative place of Euskal Herria within the domain of present-day states. We believe the interesting theoretical contributions set down on these pages will contribute to endowing the demand for a Basque state with substance, while also proving useful in order to lay a sound material and ideological foundation such as is necessary in order to give form to that endeavour. IPAR HEGOA holds that this is the best option for everybody who lives and works in Euskal Herria and defends the premise that at this time the Basque Country possesses the basic potentialities needed to build a state that can take its place among the states of Europe.

Thus the IPAR HEGOA Fundazioa offers, in **Towards a Basque State**, a qualified contribution concerning the need for and feasibility of a newly created Basque state. The study consists of three parts covering different subject areas: **Nation-building and Institutions, Citizenship and Culture** and **Territory and Socioeconomics**. This book covers the second of these areas.

In the section on **CITIZENSHIP**, Txoli Mateos and Julen Zabalo say it is understandable that in our society we rarely talk about *citizenship* since the bundle of rights and duties this term denotes is a typically associated with the concept of a *state*. Discussion of the idea of citizenship, which has given rise to lively debates in some countries, has had a much lower profile among us in the absence of a state, as a result of which decision-making options are severely restricted. In this section citizenship is chiefly linked to the democratic function of a hypothetical Basque state. Thus the authors talk about democracy and democratic citizens, and about the need for a new political culture to help build bridges between Basque citizens.

The section on **CULTURE**, as pointed out by editor Ane Larrinaga, not only proposes to demonstrate how Basque culture suffers from the lack of a state, but also considers in what ways Basque society might benefit in cultural terms from the existence of one. Therefore the focus is on the cultural role of the state and new developments in the part the state can play. An attempt is also made to identify some of the strengths and weaknesses appearing in the cultural sphere in the course of the drive for a Basque state, and to note which issues will need to be addressed by a future state.

IPAR HEGOA hopes this volume will serve to stimulate fresh discussion and further studies on these facets of building a Basque state; for this is only the beginning! We wish to thank those who have taken part in this project for the interest shown, the time and effort they have devoted to it and for all their contributions; our thanks, therefore, to the volume's editors, Julen Zabalo, Txoli Mateos and Ane Larrinaga and to all the chapters' authors.

The Basque State and citizenship

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Julen Zabalo Bilbao
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Introduction

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Ernest Gellner, one of the foremost thinkers on nationalism, is known to have said with a touch of irony that a nation always seeks a state, but preferably its own, not somebody else's.

Paradoxically, there is very little discussion in Basque society or in Basque nationalist circles about the concept of *citizenship*. The reason why I call this a paradox is that when Basques hear the word 'citizenship' various notions that are forever being bandied about in our midst spring to mind: nationhood, statehood, country, rights (especially political rights), and so on. Yet it is quite logical (not paradoxical) that this concept should not be very current since status is linked to statehood. It is the prior existence of a state which brings to the foreground issues and understandings about citizenship, the seeking of consensus and the opportunity for disagreement. In the absence of a state, as in the Basque case, there is very little room for any decision-making on matters of relevance to citizenship, so it is rather futile to start squabbling over such issues. The more democratic a state is, the more profound and complex such problems, debates and eventual solutions are likely to become.

Migratory movements triggered by globalization, and shortcomings in the actions of democratic institutions, among other causes, have led to a questioning of the organisation of society and its form of leadership known as the liberal democratic state. Searching questions are being asked concerning citizenship and democracy, issues that are pertinent to a country's essential identity and the relationships binding its inhabitants. The recent growth of a scientific literature on these subjects in those countries which have made the greatest headway in their thinking on democracy, such as Canada or the United Kingdom, and which do not have a conflict over national identity, such as the United States of America, bear ample witness to this. Here we find theoretical attempts to correct the faults of liberal democracy, and they are pervaded by ideas which no longer refer to *representative* democracy, but rather *deliberative*, *strong*, *participatory* democracy. At the same time, there have been attempts to expand on the civic and ethical dimensions of citizenship, emphasizing the role of education in seeking to produce responsible citizens. There is discussion not only about the necessary characteristics of citizens for democracy to work, but also the limits of citizenship itself. To begin with, defining who is a **citizen** and who is an **alien** is no simple matter, and on this distinction depend many things including eligibility for assistance from the welfare state and the right to vote. All the chapters in this section take as their common theoretical starting point the debates that are underway in all modern countries concerning the nature of the democratic connection among citizens, or to put it another way, the need for democracy to be strengthened.

To the need for a new definition of citizenship and democracy another variable must be added in our case, since we are talking not only about the state, but about a *Basque* state. Euskal Herria, also known as the Basque Country, is a modern, advanced society which would seem to have a need for a state capable of dealing with its many challenging issues, and of providing for a wide variety of needs: that is, for a Basque state. The chapters in this section attempt to address the point. They adopt the assumption that things might be different for Basque society if it were invested with the authority to govern its own affairs. At the same time, however, the authors have endeavoured to present on these pages a scientific analysis, not a mere inventory of *desiderata*.

In a country without a state, there can be no legal stipulation of who constitute its citizens and who are non-citizens. Since Euskal Herria is split between two states (and three administrations), most of its inhabitants are legally French or Spanish citizens, so officially there is no such thing as *Basque citizenship*. Apart from political-administrative status, several national allegiances compete with each other in Basque society, some people feeling French, some Spanish, others Basque. As one article in the present section puts it, an inhabitant of Portugal does not ask herself whether or not she is Portuguese. She never questions her citizenship and nationality, for they are both the same, both clear, and well-defined. The same is plainly not true of people living in the Basque Country. In their chapter "On state, citizenship and national identity", **Julen Zabalo** and **Txoli Mateos** discuss the problems to which this state of affairs gives rise. The initial premise is that we should differentiate between national identity and administrative status: the former is subjective and depends on personal choice; the latter, objective. There will undoubtedly be some thorny issues to resolve in this regard in the future, but it seems that the specification of citizenship *per se* should not lead to much controversy because nowadays *residence* is, to a large extent, taken as the only criterion determining what Basque citizenship consists of. As the authors point out, political diversity and the peaceful coexistence of different national identities could prove perfectly feasible in a hypothetical Basque state. Nevertheless, like all nation states, the Basque state will always seek to equate nationality and citizenship among its inhabitants.

So the people belonging to a nation and its citizens are not automatically the same thing to start with, and matters get more complicated when immigration comes into the equation. In *any* country, the question of where immigrants fit into the scheme of things is difficult and controversial: an immigrant is neither a member of the nation nor a citizen of the state, but on the other hand an immigrant is not simply a foreigner either. Speaking in general, whether or not a nation has its own state, the relationship between nationalism and immigration is a complex one, and that is no less true of Basque nationalism. The Basque Country has had ample experience of immigration, and having already undergone two distinct waves of immigration producing mixed reactions and effects, it is pointed out that the lessons this offers need to be learnt if we intend to argue for the benefits that would ensue from a Basque state. But in any case it is to be borne in mind that a profound social debate has not taken place in the Basque Country about immigration in connection with citizenship or nationhood, for the simple reason that Basques have so far lacked the political power or legal authority to do anything about it. Therefore, at present, the issue of immigration has mainly been present in discussions in areas other than politics, particularly in debates over social issues. This state of affairs is reviewed in "Citizenship, immigration and the Basque state", in which **Iker Iraola** argues that the process of achieving a Basque state should open up a debate about the political dimension of immigration, at which point many questions requiring answers will need to be addressed, such as defining the criteria for becoming a Basque citizen, managing the multiculturalism that ensues from immigration, how to approach the rights of immigrant groups, and finally, the subject of immigrant assimilation or integration. This suggests the need to develop a specific national migration policy, which only a Basque state would be able to implement and manage adequately.

In Basque society, the subject of immigration often comes up in debates about the school system and the language of schooling. In any democratic society, the way the school system is oriented is deemed a *national issue*; schools are a highly effective tool for integrating and socializing a country's citizens. In short, the school system serves not only to prepare skilled members of the labour force but also creates responsible citizens and members of the nation. Consequently, **Txoli Mateos** relates education to citizenship and democracy in particular, in the chapter "State, education and the Basque citizen". He assigns to a future Basque state three tasks which will undeniably benefit Basque citizens. One of these is the creation of a national education and research network which, while

recognising the specific characteristics of each Basque region, will end the present administrative fragmentation which is so disadvantageous to Basque society. The status of schools in an education system under a national administration, and the languages of schooling, are some of the things that would have to be decided: this will no mean task by any means! A second point would be to provide for all Basque pupils to receive civic and moral training in order to make for a stronger Basque citizenry. A future Basque state will not only need to nurture in students loyalty to the political structure and love of their nation, but also produce citizens who defend democratic values. Lastly, to achieve the integration of all Basques, the schools must attend to *old* and *new* multiculturalism while still according special treatment to Basque culture on account of its vulnerable situation.

In addition to Basque culture, there are other weaker players besides immigrants, such as women, as is pointed out by **Mila Amurrio** who relates the defence of women's rights to the call for a 'new citizen' linked to the Basque state in "Citizenship within feminist theory and practice". She begins by recognising that defining the limits of citizenship is a great challenge, since it may fail to satisfy all sectors of society. In accordance with feminist thought and practice, it is absolutely necessary to be explicit about the way gender relations may influence the construction of a new kind of citizen. In the interest of redefining those relations, strong guarantees of women's participation must be established, first and foremost, taking into account the interests of groups of women. But for this to happen, a *sine qua non* is the promotion of a *new political culture* which insists on fargoin changes in the power relations between men and women.

Within the process of constructing a Basque state, then, defining citizenship must be seen as a multi-faceted task with many dimensions, as is amply acknowledged by all four authors. It has to be admitted that there are great difficulties involved, but at the same time many undeniable benefits are perceived. The challenges posed by modern societies can be confronted here as they are by political authorities elsewhere: through sovereign decisions of the Basques' own state.

1. On state, citizenship and national identity.

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Citizenship is conceived of as related to the nation-state and democracy. In modern societies, a citizen is viewed as equivalent to a member of the nation. Furthermore, the more democratic a society, the more profound the debate over the civic characteristics of citizenship. Thus in political, social and economic terms, the notion of citizenship involves duties and rights. Hence as we move in the direction of a Basque state and work towards making the coexistence of different national identities within Euskal Herria feasible, we should think of nationality as part of a subjective (voluntary) domain, and of citizenship as part of an objective domain, while keeping in mind that, like all nation-states, the Basque state will always seek to treat nationality and citizenship as equivalents among members of the population.

1. CITIZENSHIP

The concept of citizenship has a long history in western societies. In antiquity, the concept was employed, as in *cives romani*, to represent a relationship between the individual and his or her city. The term reflected a privileged status, with recognition of the right of citizens to take part in public debates. Only "free men" were allowed to be citizens, not foreigners, women or slaves. Likewise in the Basque Country, until fairly recently only landowners were full citizens. With the birth of the absolute state, an inhabitant within the state's borders was considered a subject of the monarchy, but with the American and French Revolutions citizenship took on a new dimension as it was merged into the idea of nationality. The subject became a citizen, also considered a member of the nation.

The nation is the sum of its citizens, of equal components, not something situated over or under anybody: the citizens give the nation its power, and it acts on their behalf. The citizens are everybody, so the criteria which had formerly blocked some people from citizenship, such as sex, land ownership, wealth and so on, gradually disappeared. This process took a long time and was fraught with obstacles; women, blacks and people with few possessions did not achieve full rights until the middle of the twentieth century.

But citizenship is primarily a *political* relationship between the individual and the political community, whereby the individual becomes a member of the community and owes it unending allegiance. Since the emergence of modern society, this political community has taken the form of the constitutional nation-state. Thus the concept of *citizen* now current took form in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is strictly related to the idea of the nation-state. Since the mid-twentieth century, with the emergence of the welfare state, the concept of citizenship has been broadened and filled out, with the new concept centring around the freedom of the individual, participation in public debates and the right to benefit from social services.

1.1. Citizenship, the nation-state and democracy

Citizenship is what links the individual to the state, and it is also the legal status required for participation in the political sphere. Modern states stipulate who are the state's citizens and what conditions are necessary to achieve this status: conditions such as having lived in the country for a given number of years, for example. It is widely believed that the trend towards globalization will result in the loss of the nation-state's relevance in determining and managing citizenship issues. So for example citizenship may come to be seen in terms of another kind of structure over and above that of the nation state, such as the European Community. To this we may add other levels of political and administrative organisation, for example the municipal level. But for now, the nation-state still overrides any other sociopolitical structure where the definition of citizenship is concerned, with all the consequences that implies. Specifying who is a citizen and who is not, then, is no trivial matter, for on this distinction depend such crucial points as being able to receive assistance from the welfare state or the right to vote in elections, among other things.

Thus, citizenship is associated with a set of rights and obligations in the political, social and economic spheres. The spread of the idea of citizenship and its current prestige are directly related to the development of democracy. The modern history of the developed countries is the history of the evolution of citizenship, and at its core are the freedom and dignity of the individual. But there has not been, and is not today, a single way to understand all this, or democracy for that matter. The modern concept of democracy has gone through several phases during which debates have taken place over what the government of a country ought to be.

In recent years a powerful movement has grown up in developed societies to spread and strengthen the set of rights linked to citizenship; that is, to progress beyond the merely formal and legal dimension of citizenship. The crisis of the welfare state, the consequences of political apathy and the proliferation of events requiring broad solidarity are among the developments that have demonstrated that rights and institutions cannot be the sole foundations of democratic societies. On the contrary, if we are to maintain a democratic organisation of society, the attitudes and characteristics of the members of society are of vital significance. Tolerance, participation, responsibility, a sense of community, and an overall loyalty to the political system among citizens is needed. The debate within the broad political and ideological spectrum revolves around not just rights but justice, identity and political participation (see Peña, 2003; Sudupe, 1998).

The debate over citizenship brings to the fore a basic question: what constitutes a 'good citizen'? Despite the fact that it is not always advisable to attempt such classifications, let us say that three ideas of citizenship emerge in discussions of this kind, which we may call, respectively, the *liberal* idea, the *communitarian* idea and the *republican* idea. Let us look briefly at each in turn.

Liberalism seeks to equate human rights with social coexistence. It concedes to the individual the right to be critical of the community, so tolerance is one of the values it extols. But to the extent that the individual is put first, it becomes increasingly difficult to secure civic commitment. In the liberal conception, the individual is a *person* first and a *citizen* second. As a citizen, a person is represented as having a set of rights. The role of the state is to reach agreement on a number of minimum principles in the public sphere such as justice and equality. Beyond that, however, respect for rights and coexistence must be ensured, and so it is expected to take a neutral stance on matters such as lifestyles, moral values and the like, since society's basic characteristic is *diversity*.

Communitarians disagree with the liberal view of the citizen. Instead, they hold that politics, hence also citizenship, only makes sense in a framework of *shared values*, since individuals are the products of the culture and traditions of the community to which they belong. Hence the citizen is not merely the possessor of certain rights but also a member of a community sharing historical memories, an identity and a set of values, so that the proclamation of the state's supposed neutrality is really nonsense. What is more, political communities have a moral status. The individual inherits from the past of the family, city and nation a range of obligations and expectations, which are the basis of moral life (MacIntyre, 1993). Contemporary society demands certain sacrifices from the citizen, which can only be justified if the citizen feels identified with the community.¹

The central concept of republicanism is in fact the citizen. This view agrees with the communitarians concerning the importance of the collective group, but diverges regarding the need for a homogeneous society. Republicans attach importance to rational debate among citizens rather than to tradition. They also consider it essential for power to be kept under control through effective means such as the casting of lots, quotas, or occupying office on a rotating basis, all of these being methods aimed at making it impossible for power to remain in the hands of a few. *Deliberative democracy* and *participatory democracy* both derive from these two characteristics and their goal is clear: to strengthen its democratic character (see Barber, 2004). In the last resort, the objective of republicanism is to carry civic virtue into the public arena, and this can only be achieved by taking part in public life. Nationalism brings together republicans and communitarians, but the contemporary republican wishes to be differentiated from the nationalists, holding that loyalty is owed to the republic, not to a people defined by a set of cultural characteristics.

¹ It is now fashionable, in the discussion of citizenship, to speak of an *identification deficit*. The assumption is that today people lack any affection for their community (Cortina, 1997).

From this perspective, the nation consists of citizens, as in the French Revolution, and is objectively measured, since only those with a right to citizenship in an administrative sense constitute the nation (see Schnnaper, 2001).

These are all ways of understanding the notion of citizenship. Here we have not mentioned another important concept that is frequently mentioned: that of *nationality*. In modern states, citizenship and nationality are treated as the same thing. Sometimes they are indeed equivalent, and this has given rise to considerable exasperation for those wishing to keep them apart (Connor, 1978). Sometimes, on the contrary, nationhood and citizenship are retained as separate categories, and this is an entirely adequate distinction from the point of view of nationalist movements without a state. In such cases there is no state available for the clarification and protection of administrative rights, and so in the absence of an objective criterion it is useful to introduce a subjective one. So from this alternative point of view it is nationalism, rather than the state, which determines who is entitled to nationality. And the future of the nation will be determined by the strength of that nationalism.

Summing up, then, liberals talk of *rights*, communitarians of *identity* and republicans of *participation*, but always within the framework of the nation-state. But what kind of citizenship are we to think about at the present time in an Euskal Herria that has not been constituted as a state? Or to put it another way, what would be the relationship between the citizen and the political administration, and among its citizens, in a hypothetical Basque state?

2. BASQUE CITIZENSHIP

A discussion of Basque citizenship² may either be treated as a work of fiction, a purely theoretical exercise, or as a description of a plain reality. The fact that Euskal Herria lacks a state means that either option is available, and makes it possible to switch back and forth at will between objective and subjective points of view, thus adding to the subject's complexity. In the interplay between these views, the notions of *citizen* and *nation* pop up all the time; these are connected, yet distinct. In the opinion of some there is no Basque nation because they think of a nation as linked to a state, while in the opinion of others the existence of a Basque nation is an undeniable fact for several reasons including its history, language and will to exist. Thus, subjective and objective viewpoints leave the field open.

As regards nationhood, from a purely subjective point of view it is enough to note that many thousands of people think that the Basque nation exists and believe in it; in our opinion, that alone is sufficient reason to conclude that there is a Basque nation. By the same token, many inhabitants of the Basque Country who believe in a Spanish or French nation are convinced that there is no Basque nation. On the other hand, from an objective viewpoint, if one agrees to resolve the question regarding the nation's existence according to certain pre-established criteria, it would be possible to demonstrate that there is a Basque nation and a shared nationality (because Basques share a common history, or because they have in common the Basque language, for example), or to demonstrate the contrary (if having one's own state is taken as a condition, for instance).

Citizenship, on the other hand, is in principle an entirely objective concept that is applicable on the administrative level. There is less discussion of this, mainly because the

² When talking about a Basque state, we wish to pay particular attention to the equation *Basque (speaker)* ['euskaldun' in Basque] = *Basque citizen* which nowadays are assumed by many to be synonymous. In this paper we will link the concept of *euskaldun* to language: *euskaldunak* [often translated as 'Basques'] are people who speak Basque. But Basque citizens, on the other hand, may speak Basque, Spanish or French. the subject of the present article is Basque citizens.

fact that there is no Basque state means that nobody can be called a citizen of Euskal Herria even though they live in Euskal Herria. Such people are citizens of Spain, France or some other state, not of Euskal Herria. Using this objective, irrefutable argument, many deny there is any such thing as Basque citizenship, or for that matter, a Basque nation. What is more, the fact that the seven provinces that are considered to make up Euskal Herria are not combined into a single administrative entity makes it difficult even to say who would be a Basque citizen if there were such a category. However, the existence of a strong Basque nationalist movement has led to the emergence of a strong feeling of Basque national identity, and consequently, to a wish to deny Spanish or French citizenship, on a subjective level of course. As a result, a person who believes in the Basque nation does what no state would do, by resorting to self-identification: such a person says *I am a Basque citizen because that is what I wish to be*. Basque citizenship is established subjectively, although objectively it is not allowed. This does not make any difference administratively, but politically it does, because such people think the existence of a Basque nation entails the right to have a Basque state.

So, objective and subjective viewpoints tend to cut across each other, and contradictory viewpoints and conclusions are the result. But on the whole, nationhood is easier to explain in subjective terms, citizenship from an objective perspective. Does this mean that there is no point in discussing nationhood because what really counts is citizenship? Not at all; and if this cannot be said when there is a state, it certainly cannot in the case of nations without a state.

NATIONHOOD / NATIONALITY	CITIZENSHIP
Subjective concept	Objective concept

In states, nationality is closely bound up with citizenship, but the former is a component of the latter: citizenship (objective) is legally prior, while nationality (subjective) is invoked to achieve internal cohesion and to make the state 'come alive'. Things are entirely different when it comes to nations without a state. In this case, nationhood is the motor with which to attain citizenship. If it is possible to speak of a Basque state at all it will be because a significant number of people who feel like Basque citizens proclaim that state. It now becomes fundamentally important to know who feels they are Basque citizens and *only* Basque citizens, who belongs to the Basque Nation, because that information will provide the strength to proclaim a state and push for a referendum on self-determination.

SITUATION	BASIS OF AFFILIATION
STATELESS NATION ↓	← NATIONHOOD
Goal: To create a state ↓	← NATIONHOOD
STATE ↓	← CITIZENSHIP
Goal: To strengthen the state	← CITIZENSHIP + NATIONHOOD

In the next few section we will examine the subjects of nationhood and citizenship, but this time as they apply to a stateless nation: Euskal Herria. Seeking statehood, and possibly attaining it, would alter perceptions of both. First of all, as we have already observed, the subjective dimension would be developed: in order to call for a Basque state there must be

a significant number of people who want one, people who believe in the Basque nation. Then, if a Basque state came into being, the objective aspect would come to the fore because it would be necessary to determine who has a right to be a citizen. Thirdly, for that citizenship to be a uniting force, nationhood would be cultivated once again so that citizens feel they are members of the nation (while respecting the right to have national sentiments beyond the state in question).

2.1. Who is a Basque citizen? Seeking a state. Nationhood

It is slightly odd, in a normal situation, to inquire into the national sentiments of a country's inhabitants because we are used to thinking of this as an objective, straightforward and categorical fact: the nationality of a person is that of the state they live in, to which they are also affectively linked. A state is in a position to foment, encourage and give expression to nationhood, and members of the nation reserve their loyalty and even their pride concerning their nationality. Members of the Portuguese population, for instance, need not ask themselves whether or not they are Portuguese. Such a person is Portuguese, first of all, because he or she fulfils the administrative requirements for being a Portuguese subject; and because besides that, this is constantly being drummed into him or her in so many ways, through the mass media, symbols, in the country's constitution and laws, and so on. As Billig (1995) has shown, there are countless ways, at different points in one's lifetime and incorporated unnoticed into daily life through discourse, symbols, sports and so on, to promote such a national sentiment and get members of the nation to identify with the nation and its state. In the nation-state, citizens do not question their affiliation as citizens since that is taken for granted.

Citizens have to be outside the box of the nation-state's 'normal' logic in order to raise questions about their nationality. This happens for instance, when someone has emigrated to another country and has been living there for such a long time that a doubt arises about what nationality they are. It can also happen if a nationalist movement appears which challenges the logic upheld by the state.

Nationalism can work in favour of the interests of a nation-state or be turned against them. Nation-states seek uniformity within their borders, wishing for all their inhabitants to identify with each other as a single national entity, but this wish is not always fulfilled. Often enough, for one reason or another, people in a certain region will get it into their heads that they wish to break away from the nation-state. This is never easy sailing because one will come up against the power of the nation-state, yet sometimes the emerging movement acquires enough momentum to make the region's inhabitants think about it. Once that has happened, an issue that seemed quite simple until then poses new questions, as the new nationalist movement strives to appeal to the population's feelings.

That is basically what has happened in Euskal Herria. Events in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in particular, created resentment in the Basque Country, and from the twentieth century onwards some of its inhabitants responded by espousing a new definition of citizenship: henceforth their allegiance as citizens would no longer be conceived of as linked to Spain or France but to a new member-to-be of the world community of states. Once that view emerged, a clash between the nationalism of the two pre-existing states and Basque nationalism was inevitable, and in the conflict that followed people have had to make choices about their national affiliation. Adopting the nationality of the nation-state was inadequate because the Basque nationalist opposition, as it gained strength, was fostering a different national identification. The outcome is that questions such as 'What do you feel, Basque, Spanish or French?' and so on, which sound odd in some countries, make perfect sense in the present-day Basque Country, and people are aware of the question's implications and significance. So what are people saying?

There are three distinct, widespread national sentiments in the Basque Country, but they are difficult to quantify for a number of reasons. France and Spain are not overly eager to ask the question, since by not asking it they are able to maintain that the people are, *de facto*, still French or Spanish. Basque nationalism is interested, but has no way to ask the entire population systematically. Surveys and research programmes are used to register citizens' opinions, but it is not easy to ask such a question, and survey participants are often asked to talk about a subject that they have not yet given their due consideration.

Nevertheless, the data is there, and is made public from time to time. The following statistics, given by Linz, are a classic example. Obtained at the end of the nineteen-seventies, they show that the largest group of people (39.7%) in the provinces of Araba, Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia felt they were *just Basque*; when taken together with those who considered themselves *more Basque than Spanish* the figure came to 52.3%. The study distinguished between people born in the southern Basque Country and those born elsewhere. Of those born in the Basque Country, 56.2% considered themselves *just Basque* while only 9.3% of those born elsewhere felt they were *just Basque*. Among the latter, the most popular response was *as Basque as they were Spanish* (35.3%), followed by *just Spanish* (34.7%) (Linz, 1986: 40).

However, in northern Euskal Herria the most popular response (with 37%) is *just French*, adding these to *more French than Basque* responses, over half of the population is covered (55%) (ibid. 375). In Navarre, lastly, there is a special case, with the most popular response, chosen by 51% being to consider oneself *Navarrese*. Adding this to the option *as Basque as Navarrese*, the figure reaches 82% (ibid. 413).

For some more recent statistics and to make some comparisons, we will now look at the 2006 data. In a broad survey by Eusko Ikaskuntza on Basque identity and culture (Baxok et al., 2006), we encounter the same overall picture. The largest group of people in Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa (40%) feel they are *just Basque*, and adding these to those who answered *more Basque than Spanish*, they come to 55%.³ In the northern Basque Country, the *just French* option wins out at 36%, and combined with *more French than Basque* the number rises to more than half, at 52%. However, the number of those who feel they are *just Basque* has risen to 11% (all data from Baxok et al., 2006: 48).

In Navarre things are complicated again, and the data are not completely comparable with Linz's. The largest group (38%) consists of those who consider themselves *mostly Navarrese*, but these are followed by 25% who either think of themselves as *mostly Basque* (10%) or as *as Basque as they are Navarrese* (15%); finally, 24% consist of those who either consider themselves *mostly Spanish* (5%) or as *Spanish as they are Navarrese* (19%) (ibid., p. 49). It is hard to say what the meaning of *mostly Navarrese* is, but these figures suggest a three-way split between those who see themselves as Navarrese, Navarrese Basques and Navarrese Spaniards.⁴

As we can see, nationalist movements that do not have a state tend to treat nationality in a subjective manner; whereas nation-states take an objective approach that is linked to certain administrative rights. It would have been possible for the former to adopt an objective approach too, though not in administrative terms (since they are not a nation-

³ *Euskobarometro* makes it possible to compare the 2006-2007 data for these three provinces. They show figures slightly lower than Baxok's, adding up to 46%, for the groups who consider themselves *just Basque* (24%) and *more Basque than Spanish* (22%), and the largest group was *I am as Basque as I am Spanish* with 33% (source: Llera, 2009: 6-7).

⁴ Here is another interesting fact to show that our two surveys are comparable: when asked whether there had been any change in their national sentiments from ten years previously, roughly three out of four responded that there had not: 79% in Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, 76% in the northern Basque Country and 70% in High Navarre. It is significant that, of those whose feeling has changed, more (12%) feel *more Basque* now, while fewer (only 3%) feel *more Spanish* or *more French* than before. The data for Navarre are even more striking, with 18% feeling *more Basque* and a mere 1% considering themselves *more Spanish* (Baxok et al., 2006: 50).

state) but in terms of some objective characteristic such as race or language, for instance. However, Basque nationalism has not gone that way, but has chosen instead to focus on the subjective dimension, turning each national into a militant for the Basque nation.

Each person's sentiment determines their nationality, and this fact imbues the nationalist movement with great motivation and drive. It also makes it possible for feelings of Basque nationhood to be nurtured outside Euskal Herria, notably in the diaspora.

In this way, Basque nationalism is blazing its own trail. National sentiment reflects what people think, and the statistics presented here show that there exists a will on the part of a great many people to do without the idea of 'Frenchness' or 'Spanishness'. Not all inhabitants of Euskal Herria think alike, and some people attach more importance to the issue of identity than others. Consequently, some major different groups have emerged in relation to their feelings about nationhood, and this has resulted in a national conflict, because to the subjective notion of the nation (*I feel Basque*) the supporters of Basque nationalism have attempted to add the same notion of objective citizenship employed by the nation-states (*I am a Basque citizen*).

The camps defending Frenchness, Spanishness and Basqueness are all sizable, and it hardly seems likely that a proposal will emerge that makes all of them happy. An issue of people's identity requires a special solution, and in our opinion a democratic solution here can only be one which respects people's opinion and takes into account whatever the majority decides. A referendum would decide, on the basis of the right to self-determination, whether Euskal Herria should constitute a new state over and above whatever Spain and France may say about it.

Talking about the right to self-determination is nothing new in the Basque Country. Again we can look at some statistics: according to Lopez-Aranguren (1993: 253)⁵, by 1993 most inhabitants of southern Euskal Herria considered self-determination either important or very important (54% of them in the Basque Autonomous Community, 52.4% in High Navarre). The same view is borne out by more recent statistics, and has become stronger in the case of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. According to 2006 statistics from the University of the Basque Country's Euskobarometro research group (subsequently they have not focused on the issue of self-determination), 71% of the people surveyed believed that the politicians ought to reach an agreement about the right to self-determination (Euskobarometro, 2006).

In a self-determination referendum, people would be asked about their national sentiment or other interests, and it would be decided what option to take administratively, but paradoxically perhaps, not all those who think of themselves as Basque citizens would be able to participate in such a referendum, and even if a state were set up we would have to see whether all the people who feel they are members of the Basque nation are allowed to become *citizens* of Euskal Herria, because citizenship, let us repeat, is not a subjective concept but a purely objective one.

2.2. Who is a Basque citizen? Citizenship in a Basque state

In the last section we looked at what the population of Euskal Herria feels, subjectively. However, a country's administration cannot act according to the subjective opinion of its inhabitants: it cannot consider a person a subject of the administration just because that person wants to be one. If that were the case, immigrants seeking their

⁵ Aside from the right to self-determination, 48.3% in the BAC and 42.6% in High Navarre were in favour of a referendum on it. However, when an additional intermediate choice was given such as a federal state or autonomous region, the statistic for those favouring self-determination understood as the option to form a state dropped to 20% in southern Euskal Herria (data source: Lopez-Aranguren, 1993, pp. 253–256).

own material interests would be attracted, not to mention many members of the diaspora even if they belonged in national sentiment as much to the country where they lived as to the Basque nation. Since there can be no universal citizenship, there cannot be voluntary citizenship either. The world is divided into states and each state stipulates and regulates who its citizens are, and subsequently acts in accordance with its own regulations. Citizenship entails rights and duties, more than those attributed to non-citizens. It is therefore a very important matter to be the citizen of one state rather than another.⁶

In a nation-state that has to run an administration, objective criteria must be sought and implemented at the expense of subjective considerations. The state may have come into being through a referendum on self-determination, in which national sentiment has played a strong part in determining the voters' choice. However, and this is where it gets complicated, one's vote in a referendum, even if under the influence of national sentiment, ought not to have any weight, either for or against, in decisions about a person's citizenship since this must be based on objective criteria. Feeling Basque will not guarantee Basque citizenship, and not feeling Basque will not be an obstacle to somebody who has a legal right to it obtaining it.

But if not sentiment, then what is the basis to be for deciding who can be a citizen of a Basque state? What gives someone the right to be a Basque citizen? Nation-states establish clearcut conditions, usually requiring that the person should have been born on the state's territory and/or referring to the parents' citizenship.⁷ What kind of conditions would a Basque state demand? There are no data on this, since it is not asked about in opinion surveys, but we may use other statistics to obtain some idea, at least in a roundabout way.

Coming back to Linz's study, there is a section of the survey that looks at where Basque national identity is situated, in which survey participants are asked to say whom they consider to be Basques (and so, we may assume, who would have the right to claim Basque citizenship). The data are both clear and significant. Thus for example, those survey participants who feel they are *only Basque* consider that *living and working in the Basque Country* is the main criterion (for 79.8%) for having a Basque national identity, over and above *speaking Basque* (for 28.3%) and *having a Basque family* (for 41.2%). In general, most of the population (69.2%) think that living and working in Euskal Herria is a sufficient condition for determining Basque citizenship (Linz, 1986:32). Based on the same statistics, Llera follows up on this issue upto as recently as 2005, when the same trend becomes even more pronounced. So in 2005, for instance, responding to the question about *conditions for being a Basque citizen*, 85% of those surveyed think that *living and working in the Basque Country* is a necessary condition, followed by *wanting to be Basque* for 73%, and *being born in the Basque Country* for 57%.⁸ Hence those who *subjectively* consider themselves Basque are of the opinion that *objectively* people who live and work in the Basque Country should be recognised as citizens. (Legislators will have to decide how long they are required to have been living or working in the country.) It would seem, then, that in a Basque state, the definition of citizenship should not turn out to be too controversial an issue.

The Eusko Ikaskuntza group (Baxok et al., 2006) also provides interesting statistics. Asked what they will be feeling in ten years' time, very few people indeed responded

⁶ In principle the United Nations have prohibited statelessness. Although all persons are entitled to citizenship, for a variety of reasons there were twelve million stateless people in the world in 2009. Being a stateless person means losing the basic rights to which all all people are entitled; for the statistics and a discussion, see Blitz & Lynch (2011).

⁷ These criteria are known as *iure sanguinis* and *iure soli*. An interesting discussion of these issues is found in Lasagabaster & Lazcano, 1999.

⁸ Llera uses data for 1979, 1989, 1996, 2002 and 2005 from Linz (1986), taken from CIS and Euskobarometro. There are also questions about three other conditions: *speaking Basque* (given by 20% in 2005), *being of Basque origin* (28%) and *feeling nationalist* — presumably meaning *Basque nationalist*! (23%) (Llera, 2009: 9).

more French or Spanish than now, only 1% (3% in northern Euskal Herria). Most (78%) thought they would feel the same as now, but strikingly, 8% say they think they will be feeling more Basque in ten years' time than at present (and in Navarre, 11%). Moreover, people of immigrant origin in the survey followed the same pattern: 2% think they will feel more Spanish or French, but 6% more Basque (ibid., 51). This suggests there is a definite drift towards greater feelings of Basqueness.

2.3. Who is a Basque citizen? In search of a sense of community: nationality and citizenship combined

Once the Basque state has decided, on a systematic basis, who is a citizen, it would be able to move forward and take its place in the world beside other states. But for other states in the world, such a systematization of their population is not enough. They must have vitality; the citizens need to believe that they are taking part in a common project, otherwise their strength could be dispersed. So what are the options for generating such sentiments?

If the state has been created in a democratic manner, the society may possibly be initially divided into two groups. In the best of circumstances, everyone will have accepted the outcome of the referendum, but that does not mean that everybody necessarily shares a common goal. We need to know whether the people who have lost the referendum will agree to accept the new situation, but also whether those who have won will accept that other group. The Basque Country has already known such divisiveness in the past, and even without hard data we may hazard a guess about what would happen.

In 2006, according to Euskobarometro data, 64% of the survey participants thought that a referendum on self-determination would *not* give rise to a divided society (Euskobarometro, 2006). Furthermore, the question of what impact a hypothetical Basque state would have on people who do not believe in such a state has already been a subject of controversy; to be more specific, it has at times been mooted from certain quarters that a Basque state would expel immigrants and people who felt Spanish.⁹ We lack quantitative data about this, but it is possible to obtain qualitative information from a great many interviews with immigrants who had arrived in Euskal Herria between the fifties and the eighties (see Zabalo, Basterra, Iraola & Mateos, 2010). In fact, we can clearly see on the basis of responses by immigrants who do not have any Basque nationalist inclinations that such people are neither afraid nor distrustful about such an event. In fact, the question often makes provoke laughter, which shows that it hadn't even occurred to these people to consider any such possibility (ibid., 103). The people in question are well acquainted with the Basque nationalists' demands, and are not afraid of them (ibid., 109); they themselves may be opposed to such demands, but they have no intention of leaving, and would be ready to continue to cooperate (ibid., 104).

In conclusion, then, it seems that a Basque state would not result in a new problem or conflict as suggested by Spain and France's dire predictions. Rather, it appears that the inhabitants of Euskal Herria desire peaceful coexistence, and fully realise that compromises will be necessary to achieve this. But even after clarifying that, the challenges and risks are many and one will have to live with them, in the beginning at least. On the other hand, benefits may also ensue, as is pointed out in several of the other articles in this collection.

Many aspects regarding citizenship remain to be resolved, such as citizenship criteria, European citizenship, multicultural issues and the rights and obligations of citizens (see Lasagabaster & Lazcano, 1999), but it would be premature to discuss these matters here,

⁹ Needless to say, this is a view cultivated by Spanish nationalism, but to be honest it does reflect one school of thought in Basque nationalism too. However, this way of thinking generally harks back to the old-fashioned race-nationalism of earlier times and in fact has no place at all in the discourses used by present-day Basque nationalist parties.

and in any case they probably lie outside the scope of this paper. One such issue, double citizenship, has been talked about on more than one occasion. Some confusion has arisen in this connection, sometimes because of a failure to specify whether we are talking about administrative citizenship or nationality. Our argument that nationality is a subjective matter of sentiment may help to defuse the subject, because citizens (in the administrative sense) would still have a right to choose their nationality, including the option of a double national allegiance. The present-day nation-state, by conflating both concepts, makes it difficult to reject the nationality that is linked to one's state and even harder to claim a different nationality. In view of the advantages of coupling both citizenship and nationality, the Basque state would also be interested in encouraging this, but would need to maintain a broader perspective on nationality and treat double nationality as an acceptable and interesting option, in view of the coexistence of the three main nationality types within Euskal Herria.

Be that as it may, due emphasis ought to be placed on the maturity displayed by the Basque population, whatever its national affiliation, by mainly opting to support mutual, peaceful coexistence among people and by its readiness to respect democratically made decisions. This population appears to have already got started with the development of a broad sense of community, and to be prepared for the long haul.

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2. Citizenship, immigration and the Basque state.

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Immigration is directly related to citizenship, the nation and the state, revealing as it does the constructed nature of those categories. Here the impact of immigration on Euskal Herria is examined from this perspective, looking first at the processes of migration to it which have produced the make-up of present-day Basque society to a large extent. This is followed by a consideration of the way migratory movements have been viewed by the movement for the development of Euskal Herria into a state, the Basque nationalist movement, since these attitudes have played a fundamental role in defining Basque citizenship. After some observations about multiculturalism, the chapter concludes with a look at how the creation of a Basque state might contribute to this and the issues that will be raised.

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades immigration has become a basic area of study in the Social Sciences and above all in political analysis. It is such a broad subject that many aspects have been made the subject of study, but since the nineties cultural issues have received special attention. This has resulted in a great many analyses, approaches and debates concerning multiculturalism. There have also been criticisms which accuse such studies of limiting themselves to providing a cultural response to a situation which has many different aspects, and of only associating multiculturalism with immigration.

When studying immigration we should be aware of this field's many limitations; for instance, subjects that are treated as related to immigration are generally applicable to the whole population, not just to immigrants. Nevertheless, in this chapter I propose to examine the issue of immigration from the viewpoint of a host-society that wishes to achieve its own state, by looking at immigration in relation to subjects such as the state, the nation and the nationalist movement. In this sense the focus of my attention will not be on the immigrant *per se* (otherwise, I would also have to consider the benefits and problems that a new state would entail for the migrant), and when mention is made of the immigrant's point of view it will be in relation to the perspective outlined above.

'Immigration' and 'immigrant' are disputed categories that have been discussed from numerous angles. In the opinion of some, the label 'immigrant' is better avoided because of its negative connotations. In this view (see Bilbeny, 2009), only people who have arrived recently should be spoken of as immigrants. The point of this is to do away with the category of 'immigrant' and just consider such a person as a 'normal' full citizen, without this implying any wish to belittle people's original cultural identities or customs as a result (Zapata-Barrero, 2004). Be that as it may, in this study I will use the term 'immigrant' in a vaguely defined way to refer to all inhabitants who have originally come from anywhere outside Euskal Herria, even when the process of their migration began decades ago.

To begin with I will consider some key concepts referring to the relationship between immigration and the state or nation on a theoretical level, before turning to look at the Basque Country's situation in detail. First of all I will focus on the most salient characteristics of the flows of immigrants to Euskal Herria; then the most significant debates that have taken place in the Basque Country on the subject of immigration will briefly be reviewed, focusing on the main lines of thought and developments in the Basque nationalist camp regarding immigration. Following that, I will examine some of the notions that constantly enter into discussions about contemporary immigration such as 'integration' and 'multiculturalism', and I will conclude by attempting to relate the ideas discussed to the need for a Basque state.

1. IMMIGRATION, STATE AND NATION

Migratory movements have many consequences both for the migrants' land of origin and for the destination country. Here I will focus on the relationship between immigration and the concepts of nation and state.

Immigrating means moving to a different state, which has a number of *administrative* effects, such as the actual entry process, work permits, regularization of legal status and so on. But the state is not concerned with this administrative aspect only. There is also an undeniable political facet, and here is where the variable of 'nation' enters the picture.

States typically attribute to their territory a national nature and characterise themselves as a *nation-state*. The state bases its claim to legitimacy on the existence of a nation. There are many ways to understand 'nation', and different elements may be emphasised when defining the nation and specific nations in particular, such as language, ethnicity, history and national aspirations; but in the last resort the nation is a political fact linked to a political goal. Claims to nationhood are not limited to states, and there are many nationalist movements which have not attained to statehood; in many countries there are conflicts between the nationalism of the state and those without a state on this account.

So when migrants move to a state, they also enter a nation. It may be the case that there is no contradiction between the two planes of reality, or that the contradiction that exists is only of concern to a small minority group with negligible social impact. But if there exists in the country a significant nationalist movement which disagrees with the nation championed by the state, a national conflict may be in store; and just as local inhabitants will hold a position on the matter, so will immigrants. But whether or not there exists a movement to challenge the official national project, the state may be counted on to promote its own national project, or to try to do so at any rate, making use for the purpose of all the social institutions at its disposal and unconspicuously taking advantage of a multitude of events that are in the public eye at any given time (cf. Billig, 1995). The state's brand of nationalism is usually highly effective because it is not perceived as nationalism but merely as the result of 'normality'. A nationalist movement without a state, on the other hand, must declare its purpose to the world and its followers must adopt a more dynamic approach to achieve its end.

When it comes to the issue of immigration, the difficulty facing the stateless nationalist movement is evident. Such a movement lacks all the mechanisms available to the state, and comes up against numerous obstacles to its national project. It has been noted that in the power relationship between state-sponsored and stateless nationalism, because of many factors, immigrant groups often tend to align themselves with the former to the extent that this affects the immigrant's life directly and the state is the more powerful player (Kymlicka, 2003; Zapata-Barrero, 2008). However, that is not to say that stateless nationalism is incompatible with immigrants, by any means. Stateless nationalist movements may take many lines on immigration, ranging from those who go on the defensive and adopt a xenophobic attitude to immigrants, all the way to those who hope to win over immigrants to their national project. Likewise, state nationalism may also develop different approaches in this respect.

Continuing on the theoretical level, whether or not it obtains a state, the nationalist movement has a complex relationship with immigration. When nationalism specifies the limits of its nation, it defines the members of its nation — its nationals; and when it does so, it determines who are foreigners at the same time. Moreover, to characterize the national *us*, the presence of a foreign *others* is needed, even if only symbolically (Connor, 1998: 51; Triandafyllidou, 1998).

In this classification into national citizens and foreigners, the immigrant is in an ambivalent position, neither a member of the nation for an utter foreigner either. Complete foreigners have their own nation, but immigrants, living in a country that is not their own, render problematic the definitions of *us* and *others* by occupying a grey area somewhere between *outside* and *inside*. To put it another way, immigration '*adulterates*'¹⁰ the nation-state and draws attention to its historical and social character (see Gil Araújo, 2006: 59-61). The fact is that the two realities, that of migration and that of the nation or state, follow distinct logics, and as shown by Abdelmalek Sayad (2010), each opens the way to a different order of things: the national order and the migrational order, so to speak. Inevitably, the relations between these two logics are controversial.

¹⁰ Or 'denaturalizes'. Notice that the process of obtaining citizenship of a state is referred to as *naturalization*!

2. A LOOK AT IMMIGRATION TO THE BASQUE COUNTRY

The above theoretical discussion has direct implications for the subject that concerns this chapter, the relationship between immigration and a Basque state. For its application to Euskal Herria, we must first of all review the characteristics of immigration to the Basque Country, listing the principal migratory waves that have affected the country and commenting on their nature.

We shall speak about two very different immigration processes, one coming from the Spanish state, the other from other countries, which have taken place in different periods, intensifying at times and dropping off at others, but both occurring concurrently even now (even though a single discourse and social representation of immigration is discussed). If we are to consider the relationship between a state of Euskal Herria and immigration, I think it is essential to take into account the Basque Country's full range of experience regarding immigration, both positive and negative.

But first of all, a clarification. The analysis of immigration to the Basque Country is made difficult by the impossibility of obtaining valid statistics. Consequently the data given below must be understood only as a tentative approximation. For example, the immigration data for northern ("French") Euskal Herria count citizens of southern ("Spanish") Euskal Herria who reside in Hendaia, just across the official border, as immigrants. This is merely one example of the effects of the lack of recognition of Euskal Herria as a structural entity.

2.1. The precedent of Basque emigration

As is well known, in the course of their history Basques have needed to emigrate to other countries, as is witnessed by the Basque diaspora today. Special thought should be given to the place that people of Basque origin born outside Euskal Herria will have in a new Basque state. Among the world's states there are considerable differences regarding the right to citizenship of foreign-born descendants of their nationals. Let us not forget, too, that all immigrants are likewise part of the diasporas of their respective countries.

Turning our attention to immigrants to Euskal Herria, their arrival in significant numbers commenced at the end of the nineteenth century, and the flow of people emigrating from Spain proper began gathering momentum in that period until it turned into a veritable exodus. It was the beginning of a century-long process (see Ruiz Olabuénaga & Blanco, 1994, for a study of the movements of Spanish immigrants to the Basque provinces of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa). Initially, immigration to the Basque Country was focused on certain parts of Bizkaia (Bilbao, the Left Bank and the Meatzalde region) which attracted workers to industries linked to the growth of mining in the area; the number of immigrants gradually grew. In addition to internal migration within the Basque Country (many people moved from farms in rural Bizkaia to the industrial areas in search of work), the flow of immigrants, mainly Castilians, from regions of Spain bordering on Euskal Herria grew steadily.

The contrast between the demography of the northern ("French") and southern ("Spanish") Basque Country became more pronounced as a result. While the northern provinces of Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa continued to lose their population, in the other areas the situation was now changing. Although centring our attention on southern Euskal Herria, it is important to note that the situation was different in different provinces and areas within the country. In High Navarre, for instance, there was no significant influx of immigrants until the middle of the twentieth century, and even then it was slower than in other provinces (García-Sanz & Mikelarena, 2000).

But an immigration process that would make a deeper impact on southern Euskal Herria began later, from 1950 onwards and reaching a high point in the sixties and seventies. Vast numbers of Spanish workers arrived, first in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, later also in Araba and High Navarre, drawn by the availability of work in the Basque Country. This took place during the blackest years of the Franco dictatorship in Spain. The immigrants came in their greatest numbers to Bizkaia, the same region that had already had one wave of immigration, followed by neighbouring Gipuzkoa, where settlements of immigrants were dispersed in different places across the province where industrial development was moving fast; here they gathered in scattered urban centres, giving rise to one notable feature of the Basque urban landscape: hastily built working class precincts, chaotic in design, dotted all over southern Euskal Herria, populated mainly by immigrants. This was also the period, particularly in the seventies, when, on a smaller scale, an influx of immigrants to the provinces of Araba (mainly Gasteiz, the provincial capital) and High Navarre took place.

In this cycle, as in the preceding one, and as is usual in such cases generally, people went through hard times and were forced to live in miserable conditions, while at the same time industrialists had a great opportunity to grow very rich. Moreover, these events exerted an influence on the Basque nationalist movement which was taking off again at that time across Euskal Herria and undergoing a profound change of perspective, as we shall see. Another characteristic of this wave of immigration is that it was not limited to male migrants, as is typical of most economically motivated population movements; it involved similar numbers of both women and men (Ruiz Olabuénaga & Blanco, 1994: 154-155).

The tidal wave of immigrants transformed the social landscape of southern Euskal Herria. The population of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa, and to a lesser degree High Navarre, grew drastically in conjunction with the profound industrialization and urbanization of the country, with people born outside the Basque Country now forming a significant proportion of the population. Thus in 1973 the inhabitants of southern Euskal Herria who were born in the Basque Country and whose parents were also Basques added up to only 53% of the total population (Jáuregui, 1981: 69). The flow of immigrants stopped in the eighties, in the context of an economic crisis, and the migratory trend suffered a turnaround. Fifteen years would have to pass before new immigrants to the southern Basque Country made their appearance in important numbers again, and this time the immigrants had a different place of origin.

2.2. The new wave of immigration

Today Euskal Herria has a population of around 3,100,000, fewer than 10% of whom live in Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa (the northern provinces), while the highest percentage, 37.1%, live in Bizkaia.¹¹

**Table 1. Makeup of the Basque Country's population by country of birth
(northern provinces: 2008, southern provinces: 2010).**

	Araba	Bizkaia	Gipuzkoa	High Navarre	North*	Total
Euskal Herria	66.6	71.2	77.1	73.6	58.7	71.5
France or Spain	23.9	21.8	15.9	13.1	31.3	19.7
Other states, with Spanish/French citizenship	0.6	1.0	1.0	2.0	5.6	1.6
Others	8.9	6.0	6.0	11.2	4.3	7.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Absolute total	313,819	1,152,658	705,698	630,578	282,003	3,084,756

Source: Aierdi, 2011.

¹¹ The figures presented in this section are taken from Aztiker (2006) and (principally) Aierdi (2011). Most of the Aztiker data are for 2001. Aierdi's are more recent: the statistics for Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa are for 2010, and in the case of northern Euskal Herria, for 2008.

* These figures have been obtained taking into account the whole department of Pyrénées Atlantiques.

As the table shows, Gipuzkoa is the province with the lowest immigration rate, while the north of the Basque Country has the highest rate. (However, there are big differences among the northern provinces. In 2001 Lapurdi was, of all the Basque provinces, proportionally the one with the highest-percentage immigrant population, whereas Zuberoa was the province with the lowest: see Aztiker, 2006: 116.)

The recently discussed influx of immigrants from the surrounding states, and the constant flow from Spain and France following the immigration wave of 1950-1980, has also had a great effect on Basque society, in which it represents about 20% of the current population; and a further 24% of the 2001 population had one or both parents who had immigrated from the Spanish or French state to Euskal Herria (Aztiker, 2006: 117). In short, one way or another, immigration from Spain or France accounts for a part of present-day Basque demographics that is far too large to ignore.

Including immigration to the Basque Country from places not in these two states (the phenomenon to which I shall refer in this paper as 'new immigration'), Araba and High Navarre are the provinces with the highest percentage of immigrants; there are also a significant number (5.6%) of inhabitants of northern Euskal Herria who were born outside France, but who have French citizenship. Another interesting point is that the highest percentage of new immigration is found in High Navarre, precisely the southern Basque province which had the lowest level of immigration from Spain in the twentieth century. It is also notable that the regions that are receiving the highest percentage of immigrants are the southern part of Navarre, around the Tuteria (or Tudela) area, and the Errioxa (Rioja) region of Araba, both of which are basically agricultural areas where the Basque language already had an extreme minority status. The new immigration statistics are also high for the northern Basque Country, no doubt mainly around the coastal region of Lapurdi province.

Given that *officially* only immigrants from places outside Spain or France (depending on which part of the Basque Country one is talking about) are recognised as immigrants, the official percentage of immigrants for Euskal Herria, 7.2%, is lower than that for Spain (12.3%) and a bit higher than that for France (5.8%); it is also close to the European Union average, which is 6.5% (Eurostat, 2011). International immigration to western Europe began to increase much earlier, after World War II, when the influx of immigrants from Northern Africa and Turkey, among other places, began to intensify in France, the UK and Germany. So if we count all the people born outside France, whether or not they have citizenship, their percentage of the French population actually rises to 11.1%, while that of Spain remains at 14%, probably because many immigrants have not yet had time to achieve citizenship (*ibid.*).

A word needs to be said here about the duration of what I call 'new immigration'. How long has this been going on for? In southern Euskal Herria, as in Spain, the new immigration began later than in northern Europe and has risen sharply over the past decade. In Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and High Navarre, the new immigration started reaching significant levels in the first decade of the new century. The subject of the social image of 'new immigrants' (commonly equated with *illegal immigration* despite the fact that a most new immigrants to the southern Basque Country have legal status) would merit a separate study (Ikuspegi, 2011a).

The main distinguishing characteristic of the new immigration is its place of origin, a fact which tends to lend it visibility, more in fact than the actual numbers. These immigrants are generally from more faraway places than those of the earlier wave, with Latin America providing a major component. The top countries of origin for the southern Basque Country are Morocco (13.5%), Romania (12.3%) and Colombia (9.5%); however, the American continent (mainly Latin America) accounts for a full 42.1% of all new immigrants entering southern Euskal Herria (Aierdi, 2011). This is furthermore immigration with a strong female element, once again with a large presence of Latin American women. Internationally

immigration ceased to be dominated by young men in the industrial sector back at the beginning of the nineteen-seventies, and in some parts of the Basque Country a growing proportion of immigrants is made up of women with occupations in parts of the service sector.

Immigration is generally analysed from the vantage point of the state and it is difficult to obtain data at levels below that. This is particularly noticeable in the case of northern Euskal Herria, because it is not recognised as an entity by official institutions. It can be seen on the table above that immigration from France has made a deep mark on Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa, with such immigrants representing over 30% of the total population; adding this to immigration from outside France, autochthonous people now only make up around 60% of the population of the northern Basque Country. Probably most of the immigrants are located on the Lapurdi coast, while in the inland areas the opposite is the case: these districts are being emptied of people. It is an often-forgotten fact, which I believe also merits a separate study, that migration is a very important fact of life in all three northern provinces.

3. IMMIGRANTS TO EUSKAL HERRIA AND BASQUE NATIONALISM

Immigration to the Basque Country has been a long process with profound consequences of all kinds for the country's demography, economy, culture, social makeup, politics and so on, which no attempt to understand present-day Basque society can afford to ignore. Since the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between a Basque state and immigration, we must pause to consider the Basque nationalist movement¹² given that, to some extent, immigration has been one of its driving forces.

National conflict is a basic element in Euskal Herria, with different nationalisms vying for dominance in every realm of life, immigration included. Here the disagreement between Basque and Spanish nationalisms has been more evident in the south (see Zabalo et al., 2010: 37-62) than in Lapurdi, Low Navarre and Zuberoa where, apart from the fact that the situation has its own distinct characteristics, the power relationship was different and the conflict has been channelled into different areas. We will now have a look at how Basque nationalism's attitude to immigration has evolved, although we should note that many factors that have played a fundamental part in it, such as (to name but one) the position of Spanish nationalism, will have to be omitted from consideration here.

As already noted, Basque nationalism has attached great importance to the subject of immigration; this is hardly surprising given the great impact it has had on Euskal Herria. A variety of positions on immigration emerged, but one way or another immigration has been a significant issue for Basque nationalism. For our purposes, what needs to be focused on is the changes in Basque nationalism's views on immigration which have, in the course of a long, drawn-out process, evolved from a closed-minded, antagonistic attitude to immigrants towards a point of view which seeks to integrate them (cf. Conversi, 1997: 187-221).

It is no secret that Basque nationalism was born, under the influence of its leader Sabin Arana, out of a reaction against the arrival of Spanish immigrants. As we have seen, there was an important influx of immigrants to recently industrialized parts of Bizkaia at the end of the nineteenth century. At that point Arana founded the *Jeltzale* nationalist movement, which originally was of a conservative and religious nature. Hence the discourse over immigration had pride of place in the new-born nationalist movement, as indeed in all sectors of Bizkaian society at the time — not only in nationalist circles — where it had become the topic of the day.

¹² Although *nazionalismoa* and *abertzaletasuna* are sometimes considered different concepts, in this work *euskal nazionalismoa* and *abertzaletasuna* are treated as synonyms [both will therefore be translated as 'Basque nationalism' - translator].

Arana developed a hard line against Spanish immigrants, a point often emphasised even today, to the point that it has become a cliché used against Basque nationalism.¹³ 'Race' was Arana's criterion for Basqueness, yet he understood 'race' in a special way based on the possession of forebears with Basque surnames without incurring in an explicitly biological racism (Azurmendi, 1979: 128; Conversi, 1997: 68). However, there could be no place in Arana's Basque nation for immigrants, about whom he spoke in very harsh terms.

In a period when the Basque nationalists were no more than a small group, Arana adopted the idea of a 'Basque race' then current in European scientific circles and put it to his own use, proclaiming the Basque nation. Nationalist movements use different elements to delimit their nations, and Arana chose 'race', probably because he found other elements (such as language, for example) inadequate for the purpose (regarding Arana's concept of 'race', see Douglass, 2004).

For several decades the Basque nationalist movement was closed to immigrants, despite the fact that immigrants and their descendants were becoming increasingly numerous in the Basque Country, although in practice exceptions were made, and the 'racial requirements' for taking part in the nationalist movement were relaxed. Evidently, this position seriously limited the movement's capacity to expand its ranks and exert more influence. Other attitudes did start to come in gradually, very slowly at first, then with more success. Examples of these changes are to be found among Sabin Arana's followers, as we see in the declarations of some of the leaders of the Jagi-Jagi movement (Gallastegi, 1993: 110 ff.) and in a new secular nationalist tendency, outside the Arana tradition, espoused by Eusko Abertzale Ekintzak, 'Basque Nationalist Action' (see Díez Medrano, 1999: 104).

But Basque nationalism did not fare well when confronted by the ideologies emerging from the workers' movement, not to mention the negative stigma acquired internationally in the following years by the notion of *race*. Those effects were to make themselves felt fully a few decades later when, in ETA, a left-wing nationalist movement was born. At the time of the wave of immigration in the nineteen-sixties and seventies, a new brand of Basque nationalism came to the fore which adopted a different definition of Basque citizenship. The issue of race was relegated altogether, to be replaced at first by the notion of ethnicity, later still by language (Jáuregui, 1981: 133-135). The issue of immigration figured large in ETA's internal debates in the sixties: at first different points of view were discussed, but once the movement had aligned itself as Marxist, the thesis that immigrants could be integrated into the nationalist movement triumphed outright. This view was subsequently implemented in practice by the Basque Nationalist Left (*ezker abertzalea*) movement (Garmendia, 1983: 78).

This new definition of Basque citizenship opened the doors of the Basque nation wide open to anyone who wanted to belong to it, on condition that they learnt to speak Basque. This turnaround set going a tremendous leap forward in the tenets of Basque nationalism, and resulted in a radical change in relations between immigrants and nationalists (Shafir, 1995: 112). In practice it also meant a further relaxation of the 'conditions' for Basque citizenship, which now boiled down to speaking Basque, political will, and participation (Zabalo, 2006). The main requirement for anyone to be a Basque citizen was to *want* to be one. Nationalist sentiments were encouraged, and 'citizens' were asked to adopt an activist stance.

The change in the concept of 'nation', then, had far-reaching consequences for the movement's dealings with immigrants. And there was a lot of immigration going on at the time, but now, far from stubbornly refusing to let immigrants in, Basque nationalism had

¹³ It is frequently assumed that the contemporary Basque nationalist movement holds a position based on discrimination against immigrants, a claim favoured by placing undue emphasis on the premises of the movement's earliest years while glossing over its evolution over the subsequent sixty-year period. The same ulterior motive is reflected in claims that Basque nationalism is an *ethnic nationalism* understood in a negative sense.

made a different choice: it actually became an important goal of the new movement to attract immigrants to their cause and, in general, towards a sense of Basque national identification. The integration of immigrants was now a major goal of Basque nationalism (Shafir, 1995: 126; Conversi, 1997: 199). Fundamental to this new development was the left-wing character of the new Basque nationalist movement.¹⁴ And a large number of immigrants did join the Basque nationalist movement (see Garmendia et al., 1982; Shafir, 1995: 114-115; Conversi, 1997: 205). Moreover, this approach, which began in the nationalist Left, would eventually be adopted by the entirety of the broad Basque nationalist movement.

The process briefly outlined here had far-reaching consequences. At a time when survival of the Basques' national traits, in particular their language, were already under threat, the massive influx of Spanish immigrants undeniably exacerbated the situation. Within a large part of the Basque public, the sensation of gradual loss of their national traits was intense (Jáuregui, 1981: 70), and this makes the daring new direction taken by Basque nationalism at that point all the more striking.

So far I have discussed immigration from Spain because this has unquestionably had the greatest effect on the southern Basque Country to date, as well as the most profound consequences for Basque nationalism. As mentioned earlier, in northern Euskal Herria the debate developed in other domains and probably calls for a separate analysis. As for the 'new immigration', this was most notable in Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and High Navarre in the first decade of the new century, and has had less sweeping effects than the preceding immigration cycle. Given that the latter is still very recent, it can probably be assumed that the perspectives already developed by Basque nationalism on the issue remain valid.

4. SOME NOTES ON IMMIGRANT 'INTEGRATION'

Immigrant integration (Favell, 2003) is a broad concept encompassing the entire, long process that follows an immigrant's arrival in the new country. It is the source of widespread debate and touches on many dimensions of society, including the world of work, social relations, party politics, and learning the language. But let us note that structural integration (especially in connection with social structure and work) is inevitable, unlike political and cultural integration. Integration is understood as a two-way process involving both the immigrant and locals. Thus it is a process that takes place between two groups, but since there is an unequal power relationship between the two, it should be borne in mind that it is an asymmetrical process. Although often used as a synonym of assimilation, integration really implies more than that.

The state plays a fundamental role in integration, both on account of its power to define reality and via its immigration policy. The state's citizenship policy can also serve as a basic mechanism for either integrating or excluding immigrants. Moreover, although attention is often paid in this process to certain characteristics of the immigrant (such as religion, or insistence on maintaining their own customs), the inclusion or exclusion mechanisms (as the case may be) tend to depend on the characteristics of the host society (Gil Araújo, 2006: 64). However this may be done, and leaving aside for now discourses aiming to expel or marginalize the 'foreigners', all states wish to assimilate newly arrived individuals arriving in their country. In the process, the two-way aspect of integration tends to be forgotten and it takes on an assimilationist character, where demands are only made on the immigrant. The bottom line is that it is ultimately the immigrant who is told to 'integrate' into the host society, not vice-versa.

¹⁴ The Marxist influence is present in the very definition of citizenship, with frequent reference to the 'Basque working people' (*pueblo trabajador vasco* in Spanish): Basque is he/she who lives and works in the Basque Country.

Immigration, then, foregrounds social, cultural, political, demographic, legal and other questions. But in the last few decades, the cultural facet has been accorded a central position in academic studies and social debates about immigration. A phenomenon that is fundamentally social in nature has thus become 'ethnified' (Cachón, 2009: 262), as a result of which issues that have other causes as well (such as class, gender, age and so on) are provided with 'cultural' explanations.

Of late, the various ways in which both states and social and political actors address multiculturalism ensuing from immigration have become an endless source of research topics in countries where immigrants have reached significant numbers. Cultural diversity, influenced by immigration, has increased in the host societies, or to be more precise, diversity has become more noticeable. Many models have been developed to address multiculturalism resulting from immigration, according to the context (since, though not the only 'multiculturalism', this is the one that attracts attention). Until the nineteen-seventies, the major paradigm, especially in the English-speaking world, was that of the *melting pot* whose goal was to integrate the immigrant into the host society's culture (as if there were such a thing as a single culture) in different ways. According to this point of view, the process of integrating into the host society, which was assumed to happen 'naturally', was the business of each immigrant. From the seventies onwards, however, the faults and limitations of that paradigm have come to light, and a positive appreciation of multiculturalism, or cultural diversity, arose. Recognising that the putative cultural homogeneity of the host society is a false premise to start with, this view puts the diversity of cultures contributed by immigrants in a positive light. It is now the standard assumption in most immigration studies (see López Sala, 2005: 77-92).

The main paradigm of cultural diversity, that which has been most studied and provoked the most controversy, is that of multiculturalism,¹⁵ which setting out to achieve social equality and cohesion, places the emphasis on protecting the right of national and ethnic minorities to be different (hence it is not exclusively concerned with immigration), and on the whole springs from a liberal viewpoint.¹⁶ Its message may be summed up as: "We are all equal in sharing the same right to be culturally different."

Multiculturalism is criticised from many angles, ranging from those who think that it undermines social cohesion by promoting differentiated cultural communities (see e.g. Sartori, 2003) all the way to the critical feminist standpoint¹⁷, for instance. There are indeed many different ways to understand multiculturalism.¹⁸ In any case it is obvious that the issue of cultural diversity does come into the integration process that immigrants need to undergo in the host society. Hence the state also needs to define a position on cultural diversity. The proponents of multiculturalism transcend acknowledgment or acceptance of cultural diversity, elevating it to a right.

Once we get beyond the liberal premise of the state's neutrality on ethnic issues, the diversity resulting from immigration and the diversity associated with stateless nations must be linked, in cases where there is a strong nationalist movement that does not identify with

¹⁵ Within the field of cultural diversity, there is a paradigm which is sometimes claimed to go beyond multiculturalism called *interculturalism*. It is by no means clear, however, where the line is to be drawn between it and multiculturalism. Interculturalism claims to give priority to the mutual relationship and synthesis of cultures, while accusing multiculturalism of emphasizing the differences and contrasts between cultures. Interculturalism has mainly been developed on the 'micro' level, particularly in the field of education.

¹⁶ *À propos*, Nimni's (1999) criticism is also worth considering. In his opinion, the Left is mainly responsible for the hegemony of the liberal perspective in the contemporary debate over multiculturalism, because instead of adhering to the theoretical position historically defended in the Left (as e.g. in Austromarxism) of accepting difference, it has abandoned this perspective to the liberals.

¹⁷ Feminists argue that the 'defence of one's own culture' implied by multiculturalism may lead to an essentialist understanding of culture and its reification, resulting in a tendency to forget about power relationships (e.g. between the genders) and internal dissidence within cultural minorities (Yuval-Davis, 2010). From another perspective, Žižek criticises as false liberal multiculturalism's 'acceptance' and 'tolerance'. Žižek furthermore situates those demands within the logic of the global market; in his opinion liberal multiculturalism orients the struggles of minority groups towards acceptance rather than opposition to the system (Žižek, 1998).

¹⁸ See Galfarsoro (2012) for a critical review of multiculturalism.

the state's nationality. In such contexts, the classification proposed by Will Kymlicka is taken as a reference point, a distinction being made between two categories, *multinational* and *polyethnic*, to refer to the main kinds of cultural diversity. According to this, a multicultural state will be a *multinational state* if its citizens are members of different nations, and a *polyethnic state* if they have immigrated from different countries, insofar as this difference has personal or political significance (Kymlicka, 1996: 35 ff.). Normally states will be either multinational or polyethnic (or both), but given that each source of diversity gives rise to different kinds of requirements, the distinction is useful.

With this as his starting point, Kymlicka takes the position that the challenge of multiculturalism is to reconcile national or ethnic differences sustainably while achieving that reconciliation in an ethical manner. Thus Kymlicka extends the subject to the realm of rights. The point defended by multiculturalism is that the collective rights of immigrants and other minorities should be recognised. Expressed schematically, he distinguishes between rights to self-government, polyethnic rights and special rights to representation. The first of these types of rights corresponds to nations without a state; the second is consequent upon polyethnic diversity and is therefore associated with immigration. The latter, in contrast to rights to self-government, have as their goal the integration of ethnic minorities into the society. Lastly, the point of special group representation rights, which are temporary rights linked to the notion of affirmative action or positive discrimination, is to achieve institutional representation for different groups, not only national or ethnic groups (Kymlicka, 1996: 47 ff.).

Applying the multiculturalism approach to Euskal Herria, the contributions this paradigm can make to the Basque situation have been debated, not so much from the perspective of the nationalism that already has its own state but from that of a movement fighting to achieve one. Here emphasis is placed on the need to avoid any kind of assimilationist thinking (even when this may be disguised under the term 'integration') and to insist on the importance of taking immigrants' rights and points of view into account. Based on this approach, the proposal has been made to incorporate a proclamation of immigrants' rights into the overall movement to defend the rights of Basque citizens generally, aiming thereby to construct a movement encompassing the demands of inhabitants of Euskal Herria of diverse origins (Albete, 2008).

5. IMMIGRATION AND THE BASQUE STATE: BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION

Immigration is a political issue. The very notion of immigration in modern times, normally referring to migrations from one country to another, is linked to that of the state: immigration consists of movement between states. Citizenship, understood as membership of the state nationality, contrasts with 'otherness': hence with foreigners and, more controversially, immigrants too. But rather than excluding or segregating immigrants, the discussion over immigrants revolves around 'integration', notwithstanding the controversy surrounding this notion; and in this process, the issue of culture has dominated the stage in recent times. However, there is an asymmetrical relationship between the host society and the immigrant, and despite insistence that integration is a two-way process, it is still a relationship between domains whose social position is based on difference.

The political nature of immigration is nowhere seen more clearly than in the case of a national conflict. When numbers of migrants reach significant levels (remembering that this category is a cover term for countless different places of origin, cultures, classes, genders etc.) in countries where a national conflict is being played out, immigration becomes an important item on the political agenda. Immigration services are normally in the hands of the state, with which migrants typically have their first dealings on an institutional level. That being the case, unless the nationalists without a state develop their own relations with immigrant, this may well result in the state inducting immigrants into its own national project, especially if there are more opportunities for social mobility within the nation

associated with the state and its culture. Therefore the public debate over independence in some countries (Quebec being the best-known case) is sometimes linked to the immigration issue, or to be more precise, to this country's need for competence to develop its own immigration policy.

In the Basque Country there is a different situation. Given the lack of competence to deal with immigration (as a matter connected to citizenship and its 'national' dimension), there has been no real public debate on the issue, and politically too, the issue has not been focused on. Discussion of Basque citizenship, on the other hand, gained momentum in the seventies and eighties, at least in the case of the political avantgarde. But today immigration is largely a topic of conversation in other domains, particularly in connection with social issues and, secondarily, in education and language circles.

However, the political dimensions of immigration will have to be discussed in the process of turning Euskal Herria into a state, and when that happens many issues that need to be resolved will be raised including, in particular, the issue of citizenship¹⁹ (conditions for becoming a Basque citizen); the question of cultural diversity associated with immigration (the place for those 'cultures' in different domains of Basque society, such as education for instance); the role of the Basque language in connection with immigrants, and the place for the other languages of the Basque Country (Spanish and French) and of those spoken in it as a consequence of immigration; the treatment and rights of immigrant groups (a discussion on the rights of groups); and immigrant integration (including clarification of the goals that lie hidden behind the word 'integration' and the mechanisms used).

So, a Basque state will have to address different goals regarding immigration, since it will need to serve the interests of all the citizens living in its territory, whatever their place of origin may be. It will aim to strengthen the pillars of the Basque nation, as well as to promote immigrants' well-being and their equality with other citizens. And here it will be as well to bear in mind that *immigrant* is a blanket term and that immigrants are not only individuals who have moved to the country; they each belong to other categories too, such as class, gender and so on. Therefore it is worth pointing out, even if it seems obvious, that all the benefits that accrue to Basque citizens thanks to the existence of a Basque state should also apply to its immigrants.

Every nation that provides itself with a political structure develops its own national immigration policy. And all 'developed' states develop a specific procedure for individuals arriving in the country. Such a national immigration policy will include, among other things, rules and procedures for entry into the state's territory, the acquisition of citizenship and the broad process of immigrant integration, *inter alia*. Some of these matters are of course the responsibility of the European Union in the present case.

Also, the Basque state, like any other, will need to develop its particular policy on migration, which will give Euskal Herria powers and options that it lacks under the current administrative arrangement in which it has no such competence; the impossibility of obtaining certain data for the Basque Country specifically is just one example of this fact. An important part of that policy will concern the immigrant integration process, which it will be possible to design from within Euskal Herria from scratch with clearly defined objectives. Then, for example, unlike now, the Basque language will have a place in that process.²⁰ Another subject that I have not focused on in this chapter is that of the injustices resulting from present-day policies, but in my opinion a future Basque state should, at the very least, address the challenge of trying to eradicate these, remembering as always that integration is a two-way affair and that it is the job of locals as well as immigrants to adjust.

¹⁹ This subject is discussed in another chapter of this volume.

²⁰ One consequence of having a state may be that the Basque language will be treated as a normal part of life rather than as a special feature of a part of the Spanish territory (or French territory, if it were even given that official treatment).

If we want to think about what relationship a Basque state will have with immigrants, it is important to bear in mind the Basque Country's experience with immigration. In this article I have taken note of two aspects of that long, far-reaching process: the major waves of immigration to Euskal Herria starting at the end of the nineteenth century, on the one hand, and Basque nationalism's response to them, on the other.

From the first of these points we conclude that the population of Euskal Herria has diverse origins. Although this is sometimes viewed as a problem, in any case homogeneous societies are actually a myth. Moreover, the makeup of the population of Euskal Herria is not radically different from that of its neighbours. With regard to what I have called the 'new' immigration from overseas, while it is true that the situation is different in each country, the number of immigrants is fairly low in comparison to many European countries, including our immediate neighbours.

In the second place, I have talked about evolution within Basque nationalism on the issue of immigration. I consider this an important topic, because given that the Basque nationalist movement is the force that is driving for a Basque state, the view of immigration developed by that movement acquires considerable significance. We have seen that over the course of time the nationalist movement came to defend, by the second half of the twentieth century, the incorporation of immigrants within the Basque nation. Within Basque nationalism and in Basque society generally, that position provides us with a basis for addressing new immigrations.

Thus considerable experience exists on the subject of immigration in Euskal Herria, and the movement in favour of a Basque state has already addressed the topic, although the great debates took place several decades ago. These may be regarded as strong points for the future state. Contemporary immigration raises some new issues (witness the variety of viewpoints on immigrant integration, for example) which were not resolved in the period of the earlier waves of immigration; these should certainly be pursued, and I believe that the creation of a Basque state can only have a positive effect in that respect.

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3. State, education and the Basque citizen.

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The direction taken by the school system is recognised as a "national issue" in all modern democratic societies, since it is the job of the schools to produce not only a skilled workforce but also responsible citizens and members of the nation. A future Basque National Education System will have three new tasks. One will be the creation of a nationwide education and research network to remedy the difficulties faced by present-day Basque society on account of current administrative divisions. Another will be to provide all the students of Euskal Herria with civic and moral training in order to strengthen their sense of Basque citizenship. The future Basque school system will not only need to instil into students a sense of loyalty to political institutions and a love of their nation, but also to produce citizens who will defend democratic values. Thirdly, in order to achieve the integration of Basque citizens, schools will need to acknowledge both old and new cultural diversity, while giving pride of place to Basque culture given its vulnerable situation.

1. NATION, STATE AND EDUCATION

Education as a discussion topic is as old as the concept of *childhood* as understood in the modern era, which began to take shape in the sixteenth century in association with the development of the modern family. Interest in education, linked to the emergence of *school systems* from the eighteenth century onwards, has continued until the present day and shows no sign of being about to wane; quite the contrary, in fact. Universal literacy and the right to an education are modern values which are seldom questioned these days. There is a striking degree of agreement and consensus among different societies and school systems over the recognition of this right. Moreover, for a long time in western societies and more recently in new states that have sprung up around the world, the right to a basic education has also become an *obligation*, in contrast to other rights associated with citizenship, such as the right to vote, where there is less agreement and more opposition.

Because not every part of every community possesses the resources to implement this, it is the state that takes responsibility for ensuring that this right is fulfilled, and most importantly, education is made an essential aspect of the state itself, with the social, economic and political functions of the school system basically serving to uphold the very survival of society. In other words, the state is the protector of citizens' living conditions and their social and political integration, and it performs this task through the medium of a *national school system* (Gellner, 1988: 52).

The route that finally led to the embodiment of what is today called the nation-state was a long and arduous one. The concept started taking shape in the sixteen and seventeenth centuries and resulted in the declaration of *national interests*. For the first time, society began to be seen as a unified entity. It gradually became increasingly necessary to legitimize the state in terms of the *nation*, as states felt the need to gain citizens' loyalty in order to get them to satisfy its requirements, such as the payment of taxes and service in the state's army.

In the type of nation-state to which the modern state lays claim, *nation* and *inhabitants of the state* are equated with each other, and to bring about that equivalence the state undertakes a deliberate *integration policy*. Symbols of national identity are created, and a school system is set up to foster a sense of national identity in children, teach them its history (directly and indirectly) and nurture patriotism.

It is therefore not by mere chance that the nineteenth century is known both as the *century of the child* and the *era of nationalism* since these two things have been inextricably linked since that time. For the first time, education was considered an issue of universal interest, and the child began to be seen as a public resource to be taken care of. The authority of the nation-state progressively displaced that of other social entities (notably the family and the church). The development of a public school system can only be understood in the context of the process of building the modern state. That process is not only about setting in motion the government's administrative and political apparatuses. Collective ideologies and beliefs were also developed, and with them concepts of nationality and nationhood: this has been called 'strong planning for political socialization' (Smith, 1991).

All modern nation-states consider education a national concern of special importance, although system of different kinds are found depending on the type of state and of authority exercised in different states. In the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, social partnership was developed on account of the weakness of state authority; while in France and Spain, on the contrary, state partnership became predominant, because of the greater degree of state authority and centralism (see Ramirez & Boli, 1999). The degree of literacy and technical skill required of people is so high that only a *national school system* can satisfy the educational needs (Gellner, 1988: 52). Thus in modern

societies all phases of education have come under state control, and the implementation of the right of all citizens to education devolves on the public administration which operates through regulation and distribution of public funds.

The placement of all forms of education under state control does not mean that the distinction between public and private schools is erased, but somehow or other there is a blurring of the sharp line dividing the two which at least in former times, and in some countries, seemed to be absolute. To some extent that distinction is a reflection of the evolution of the state's own characteristics, which also vary as the modern nation-state's character is constantly being modified. Since the middle of the twentieth century this became the *welfare state* in the most advanced western countries, while more recently there is talk of the *market state*. The state administration, then, is not only involved in the regulation of the economy but also in determining its own future direction. Meanwhile, the character that justifies calling education *public*, namely its openness to all citizens regardless of their social origin, is increasingly being brought into question as the quest for excellency proceeds, under market pressures, as more and more public teaching institutions are transformed into arenas of competition. Yet at the same time, the borderline between these systems is becoming increasingly less well-defined as a result of the gigantic system of grants to the private school network which is not under direct control from the public administration.²¹

2. THE FUNCTIONS OF A NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM

Unlike earlier societies, today it is understood that an education system should be a single institution which, step by step, encompasses the entire educational process all the way from elementary school to university, managing this process in a way which incorporates all the appropriate administrative and rational characteristics. Education is seen as a strategic issue of public concern in all modern societies today, and decisions on its future directions are placed at the centre of political and theoretical debates.

Let us consider some trends that may lead to a re-examination of the philosophical foundations of late-twentieth-century democratic organisation. We can start with the fall of the Berlin Wall. With the collapse of communism, the needs of the newly democratic European countries began to make themselves felt, and this resulted in special attention being paid all over Europe to the development of civic education programs to train citizens in democracy. Meanwhile, in the United States and Canada the individualist outlook of liberalism entered a crisis provoked by a philosophical and political debate, and many thinkers asserted the need to review and strengthen the basis of democracy. And lastly, globalized economic relations and unending waves of migration have also stimulated new thinking about the model of the citizen that it is the task of the education system to educate (see Naval, 2003). While it is the primary job of the schools to prepare the child to be a member of society, in advanced countries where liberal democracy has prevailed there is an eternal debate over the need to raise citizens loyal to a democratic society and workers capable of contributing to an economy based on new, globalized relations.

The schools, and hence the public authorities, are called on, then, to perform a triple task:

- a. To enter into and participate in the information society, providing the training needed for the so-called Third Industrial Revolution.
- b. To produce civically responsible citizens capable of participating in political life.
- c. To implant national pride, the nation's culture and a sense of belonging to the national community, while at the same time fostering respect for cultural diversity.

²¹ Cf. Oberti (2005), which presents a comparative analysis of school systems in several countries.

2.1. The task relating to the socioeconomic structure of society: scientific and technological training

In South Korea, teachers are known as nation builders. Here in America, it's time we treated the people who educate our children with the same level of respect... We want to prepare 100,000 new teachers in the fields of science, technology, engineering and math. In fact, to every young person listening tonight who's contemplating their career choice: If you want to make a difference in the life of our nation; if you want to make a difference in the life of a child, become a teacher. Your country needs you. (Barack Obama, US Congress, 25/1/2011)

It is no secret that the birth of the education system was closely linked not only to the nation-state but to capitalist economic structure. The birth of the industrial enterprise, among other things, brought about the promotion by schools of the economic socialization of childhood, that is to say, their endeavour to provide the adequate minimum skills and attitudes needed for the new economic system; the schools became the doorway to the factory. For two centuries, many different kinds of relationship between the education system and the economic system, or job market, have developed of which, speaking in general, many social scientists have been extremely critical. The schools, they argue, do not *really* prepare pupils for jobs but only teach them to be slaves of the capitalist economic system. The actual training needed by workers, then, is acquired outside school. However, schools have a direct role in the reproduction of the economic system by inducing in children an acceptance of social inequalities. Many pages would be required to tell this story in full. A few ideas in particular have been extremely influential in the analysis of education. All in all the trend has been to downplay education's economic functionality and instead to emphasise the schools' ideological role, assuming that schools had little ability to actually produce a qualified workforce.

But present-day readjustments in the organisation of the capitalist system have led to significant changes in the demands made of the education system. Considering the role of information, knowledge and employment qualifications, schools have a clear economic purpose: now more than ever, one might say. The basis of the Third Industrial Revolution is science and technology, and it follows that in the information society the importance of a skilled workforce has increased dramatically. Among the things made possible by the intensive use of information and knowledge is the coordination, to a large extent, of work outside of the factory setting. Professions are strengthened and push out unskilled labourers, who are in constant competition with machines trying to replace them. But the needed qualifications are basically in function of the educational options and the working of the schools. Schools, hence the state, are under pressure from both the economic system and individuals to give training in the skills that tomorrow's workforce will require (Fernández Enguita, 2001).

Education addresses a great many needs of modern nations, such as scientific development, specialized technical training, cultural and artistic development, language transmission and maintenance, and so on. Hence, notwithstanding the countless faults and criticisms that can be levied against the performance of the education system, it is an undeniable fact that the schools contribute to the progress of society and citizens' well-being. In a democratic society, however, it is not thought that schools should perform this task in just any manner, since they have other responsibilities.

2.2. The task relating to the democratic organisation of society: civic and moral education

There is no such thing as an education that doesn't transmit any values, so it is pointless to debate whether or not the schools should transmit values. What is more, the only real difference between schools is that some state, frankly and explicitly, what set of values they adhere to, and others don't. In some cases this may be because they

themselves don't know what those values are, but other times it is because, ignoring the community's values, the teachers' teach their own (Etzioni, 1999: 219).

These days the school's moral function is being talked and argued about more and more openly, and people are thinking hard about the meaning of values-based teaching. A broad public interest among Basques in the issue of civic education for citizenship has come about in recent times for a number of reasons: the diminished role of religion in the schools is one; the need gradually to adapt to the rules of democratic practices, another; and a third, the constantly growing importance of cultural diversity. What kind of citizen will today's child be tomorrow? And what should the government do about it? Such questions, to which there are no easy answers, are of grave concern to the public.

But it is not easy to reach agreement about what civic education, or training for citizenship, schoolchildren should receive. According to some minimalist views, the basic means for participation in political life are sufficient; at the other extreme, maximalists hold that the goal should be to produce citizens armed with civic virtues. There are also people occupying a middle ground who say that it is enough to seek a rational understanding of justice. From the liberal viewpoint, furthermore, the highest value is the autonomy of the individual, so the main objective is to give priority to producing citizens who have opinions of their own and who are capable of impartial decisions. But those who criticise liberalism, whether from a republican or a communitarian perspective, and also generally those who would make certain changes to the liberal programme, say that the key is not respect but virtue, because only virtuous citizens are committed to the community's well-being. Inasmuch as the state, i.e. the state administration, is responsible for the education of society, it is commonly said that these views are perfectionist. There are also some who take the position, in this debate over how to improve democracy, that too much faith is placed in the ability of education to nurture a civic spirit. A citizen, they say, becomes a citizen through practice, not through formal education. What a strong democracy needs, they argue, is not citizens who only know their rights and obligations, but experienced citizens who are ready to take responsibility (Barber, 2004).

2.3. The task relating to the society's national identity: civic and national education

It is one of the main beliefs prevailing in modern societies today that all individuals are equal. In theory at least, this is a well-established idea which takes away legitimacy from attempts at discrimination. One of the catchphrases that the government administration claims to espouse in its actions is 'we are all citizens', and it is on this account that it is possible for it to attend to the social needs that give rise to the Welfare State.²²

Yet at the same time, the state is a staunch defender of the language and customs of a single cultural nation: that is, it protects one particular cultural tradition to the detriment of others. Even in the 'purest' civic societies the nation's history and culture are extolled and the nation's language and symbols are taught (Llobera, 2001).

Inevitably, the state makes certain cultural decisions, one of the most important of which concerns which language should be used at school, as is pointed out by Will Kymlicka:

When the government decides on the language of public education, it gives what is likely to be the most important form of support needed by the cultural structures, by guaranteeing the transmission of the language and its traditions and associated conventions to the next generation (Kymlicka, 2003a, vol. 1).

²² Some of our readers may remember a famous advertising slogan used by the Spanish government saying: *Hacienda somos todos* ("Internal Revenue is all of us").

It is well known how nation-states operate in this respect. The development of the nation-state may be understood as a dual process: on the one hand, cultural homogeneity is promoted among the citizenry; on the other, the sense of citizenship is reinforced; and all this has been achieved through the imposition of a universal curriculum and a single language. The end-result is the cultural homogeneity of all the state's citizens, and as a matter of fact that is the usual perception, because we have been taught to take it for granted that one country implies one culture shared by all the people in that country.

But the consequence of new migratory movements triggered by globalization is that not all people in a country see themselves reflected in the dominant, official culture, and as a result there are unavoidable tensions (see Taylor, 2003). Far-reaching debates are underway today on what direction to take in education in a framework of cultural diversity; the huge task has fallen to the education system of not only undertaking the acculturation of a new generation but raising the responsible citizens that democracy needs. Thus extreme liberalism receives considerable criticism on the grounds that defending freedom of choice is not enough, because identification is very important. Democratic policies are built upon such identification, which can facilitate the involvement of citizens in the quest for justice.

Just as we love our own children (whether biological or adopted) more than those of our friends because they are part of our family, so we value differently the cultural orientations of our country because they are ours. There is no need to argue for any moral superiority in order to say this. All that is needed is to say that some forms of life are better than others for us and our children because these orientations give meaning and enrich the internal life of the family and society (Gutmann, 2001).

Diverse approaches have been tried out towards managing cultural diversity and diversity of opinions. At the risk of oversimplifying highly complex situations and debates, they can be presented in three groups:

- *Interculturalism* emphasises the building of a synthesis based on the coexistence of different cultures through a sort of cosmopolitanism. The goal of cosmopolitan education, then, is to promote universal citizenship, overlooking local differences and reinforcing the points shared by all people. Pupils are made to think about compromise among the world's peoples to be achieved through cosmopolitanism, that is, transcendence of the borders of nation-states. But cosmopolitanism is given specific characteristics, sometimes attempting to fulfil a moral function and avoid abstract universalism. Consequently this cosmopolitanism is referred to as humanistic, civic, and various other adjectives. (Cortina, 2009; Nussbaum, 2005; Rosales, 2000).
- *Multiculturalism* is a liberal approach that encourages coexistence between all groups to support minority cultural and national rights, in defiance of cosmopolitanism. It revises liberalism by taking the stand that sharing culture or identity is more than just sharing certain principles of justice and tolerance that should prevail in public life. As Kymlicka points out, sharing principles is insufficient to address demands for self-government:

The fact that national groups share the same principles of justice does not necessarily provide them with a solid reason for remaining united rather than dividing into two different countries, since each national group may apply those principles to its own independent state (Kymlicka, 2003b: 342).

- A *communitarian, nationalist or republican* approach warns of certain dangers in radical multiculturalism, on the grounds that the latter excludes intergenerational culture and thus promotes diversity within the school. It is argued that a *common*

national identity needs to be reproduced in schools as well as educating for democratic citizenship.

From this it follows that schools should be public in their character, should be places in which members of different ethnic groups are together and are taught together. This does not mean telling schools how they must be organised and financed, but that they should be culturally inclusive and not sectarian in nature. Consequently, there should be something in a national curriculum, a central body of materials that all children should assimilate (Miller, 1997).

So a common cultural identity, i.e. a shared language and history, are essential in order to ensure the sense of responsibility and participation that are necessary for a democratic society to work. The sacrifices and moral commitment that people are sometimes called upon to make are much more feasible when people feel that they belong to a single national community: when they love their country, in other words. This is directly relevant to the curriculum that schools are required to teach:

The underlying principle that should orient schools and universities is that it is essential that those who graduate from them should have certain shared heroes, respect shared symbols and all reflect the nucleus of shared values (Etzioni, 1999).

Hence, it is argued, some sort of accord is needed so that public schools may integrate the country's history, literature and language into their curriculum, while not glossing over the dark periods of the past.

3. THE NATIONAL BASQUE EDUCATION SYSTEM: ADVANTAGES AND ISSUES PENDING

All countries that have their own political system, then, prioritize the implementation of their own education system. Hence placing Euskal Herria alongside the modern nations implies the building of a *National Education System* which would operate according to the instructions of a Basque state.

3.1. Creating a national education and research network transcending current administrative divisions

For a number of reasons, education has been a controversial topic in Basque society for some decades, and is still hotly discussed today (see, for example, Various authors, 1998). All kinds of issues have been involved: public or private schools? what language(s)? what kind of territorial network? a multilingual syllabus? how to educate for peace? how should we attend to recent immigrants? Each of these subjects is complex and demands careful thought. But we may assume that all these matters would be approached differently and find different solutions if the management of education were under the Basques' own political authority, under a democratic regime at the service of Basque citizens. An education system functioning under a Basque state in a democratic Basque Country would eliminate some basic obstacles, thereby certainly benefitting Basque society by doing away with the fragmentation of the country imposed by the present administrative separation into three unconnected areas, with all the disadvantages of such an arrangement.

In working towards a Basque state, full priority should be given to promoting initiatives on the national level, but in so doing the differences between areas of the Basque territory should also be taken into account. Thus when talking about a national education system, it is essential to make sure there is a minimal degree of homogeneity, but that does not mean eliminating or overlooking the special characteristics of each province or region, for to treat the Basque Autonomous Community, Navarre and the north as if they were in the same position with respect to education would be to turn our backs on reality. For one

thing, there are differences regarding the degree of local authority over education at present: compared to the northern Basque Country, the two autonomous administrations in the south have attained a significant degree of control, even though the Spanish government reserves for itself the power to make decisions about the school curriculum. It can be said that all three regions are alike in not having the last word on such matters. Here I have been referring mainly to non-university education, but the situation is essentially similar in all areas and at all levels. The main tenets of university and scientific policy in the area of the Basque Country are not decided upon by Basque society. Secondly, at a time today when on the European level enormous facilities are being provided to promote student mobility, it is still close to impossible for students from the northern Basque Country to attend a university in the south on normal terms, on account of insurmountable administrative obstacles. Obviously a Basque state would make sure that there existed a nationwide education and research network to meet the needs of progress in a modern Basque society at the service of all Basque citizens.

But logically, discussions about education do not only consider the differences between the central government, the autonomous administration and educators themselves, but also focus on issues concerning diversity in Basque society, that is, among its citizens, and so a Basque national administration will inevitably need to accommodate different views to resolve some of the problems.

Without underestimating the hurdles to be surmounted, clearly the possession of a political authority that united the three currently dismembered Basque school regions would lead to tangible improvements for the situation of the Basque language, provided Basque is made the language of the schools. There is no lack of studies (see, for one example, Odriozola, 2000) that emphasise the absolute necessity of such a structure to provide the thrust and the safeguards needed to ensure the language's survival. There is a broad consensus of opinion among many of society's leaders that the present language policy of the education system is in need of a thoroughgoing overhaul, but that the political resources required to carry them out are unavailable.

For reasons that need not be entered into here, Basque, as a school medium, must receive priority treatment, this is unquestionable; but at the same time it should not be forgotten that Spanish and French are also languages spoken by Basque citizens, and not all Basque citizens are Basque speakers. The Basque school system would certainly reflect that fact. So the system will need to address everyone's practical and emotional interests and their language loyalties. Given this, it may be advisable to establish the principle that, while giving Basque pride of place as the one language spoken throughout the Euskal Herria, all pupils should leave school perfectly fluent in either Spanish or French as well.

Apart from the schools' language policy, operating under a political system of one's own would provide another significant advantage, namely the possibility of conducting a thorough discussion of the reorganising of the education system without interference from the governments in Madrid or Paris. Such a discussion would of course be nothing new for the Basques, but there might be a chance to review one of the biggest controversies to date: the status of important parts of the Basque school system as either public or private, and a split that has occurred within the school system as a result.²³

Adopting the goal of constructing a national educational system under the aegis of a Basque state, there would no doubt be an opportunity to reactivate this debate. The relationship between the parallel school networks might be reviewed, including the status of the teachers, and the role of parents and students in governing the schools, while the

²³ In a nutshell, the controversy in the Basque Autonomous Community over the Basque School Law was about this. Some people thought that what makes education 'public' is its being run directly by the government administration, while in the opinion of others parents, and civil society generally, should have a say regarding the running of the schools and that, argued they, makes a school 'public'. At stake throughout this debate was the fate of the ikastola school network (see Various authors, 1998; Mateos, 2000).

future national administration would have ultimate responsibility for the system. Education is not just a private matter as some liberals hold, nor is it just an administrative concern that can be run without consulting the wishes of citizens. But this is the subject of a lively debate today, not just in Euskal Herria but in many democratic countries: who has the right to decide what direction education should take? We all know that it is a difficult question. The Basque state's administration should open the way for parents, teachers, students and administrators to achieve mutual trust, for the sake of the good education of Euskal Herria's children and young adults.

3.2. Strengthening Basque citizenship: the need for civic education

Whatever its faults, education brings many benefits, one of the most important being its responsibility for producing future citizens by transmitting, through logical reasoning and the development of 'spirit', an adequate sense of citizenship. We shall need to proceed step by step towards discovery of the most effective route to that goal and the transitional situations that the process may entail, but as of now it may be said that the production of *Basque citizens* would be one of the main purposes of Euskal Herria's education system. This means that *loyalty* to our country's political structures and *love* of the Basque nation must be nurtured in our children and adolescents. And this should be said without any reticence or qualms, in the first place because that is precisely one of the principal objectives of all national education systems anywhere in the world, for there is no such thing as schools that teach universal citizenship, as we have already seen. Secondly, the education system will need to flesh out with content the concept of Basque citizenship. In short, the aim is to build responsible citizens who will defend democratic values and practices, with the skills and preparation necessary to participate in a democratic society. There are many citizens and groups who have tried to embody the model participant in democracy within Basque society. Thirdly, the Basque education system must also produce Basque citizens who are proud of their country, identify with its national symbols and heroes, without distorting the truth about the past or compromising their critical capacity and personal autonomy. To put it another way, Basque citizenship should fuse republican, liberal and communitarian values, incorporating certain elements from each in its model of the ideal citizen.²⁴

Civic education has two components: one political (or national), the other moral. The task of a Basque education system with regard to the latter is to favour the development of citizens with a sense of membership in the larger human community, that is, willing to take a stand against inequality and resist discrimination, for it is the job of the schools to explain and convey methods and values for stopping the many kinds of inequality that exist in society. Many ways have been developed in modern society to reduce the effects of inequality and avoid discrimination of all types. Take for example the variety of approaches aimed at correcting for the penalties suffered by some because they happen to be disabled, female or homosexual, to name but a few cases, whether through affirmative action quotas, or awareness campaigns, or other means. The school should be the perfect example of these things, teaching respect for differences and taking appropriate measures, as needed, to bring about rational reflection about these issues and putting such ideals into practice in the school's day-to-day operation. That is, we think of the school as a *perfectionist* model of administration that demands that citizens be not only responsible but *virtuous*.

Of course we realise that these things require a lot of discussion and are highly complex. For one thing, it is necessary to differentiate between civic and individual virtue, but the general idea is that more attention should be paid to the moral aspects of education and the quest for the common good, and that this should be accompanied by an ongoing debate, with the understanding that debating is not merely a question of *talking* but of helping pupils, as citizens, to prepare themselves for civic and political action (Peterson, 2011).

²⁴ Cf. Julen Zabalo and Txoli Mateos' chapter "On state, citizenship and national identity" in this section.

This is one of the important issues that will need to be addressed by a future Basque State: it will be necessary to master a reasoned moral discourse, something notably lacking in Basques' civic and moral education. In some instances this has come about on account of the approach taken by the Left under the influence of a militant agnosticism which has opted to reduce the moral component of school objectives as a way of overcoming the domination of a certain moral discourse reflecting overly conservative views. Although there are growing endeavours in society and education circles to look more deeply into the issues surrounding cultural diversity and search for alternative approaches, there is a deficit of awareness about the extent to which cultural diversity raises not only linguistic issues but also religious and moral ones.²⁵

3.3. The Basque education system: a new definition of national culture in a framework of cultural diversity

In a future Basque state, not only must citizens' political loyalty and moral education be ensured, but a particular culture has to be nurtured, knowledge and use of a particular language (or several particular languages) established, a certain range of artistic expressions encouraged, and so on. As we have seen, an education system is forever making cultural choices, and cannot help giving priority to certain kinds of cultural expression over and above others. At the very least, some sort of tension will need to be managed in this respect.

For years now there has been an ongoing debate in Basque society over culture, together with the debate about language. Basically, doubt has often been expressed about the effectiveness of the policies needed to develop Basque culture (understood as culture developed through the Basque language). There has been broad agreement among a significant part of society on the basic tenet that Basque culture must receive preferential treatment in the schools if it is to survive at all. Indeed, many who support this idea are of the opinion that the only way to ensure its survival is through a Basque nation-state, i.e. that Basque culture should have the same kind of support that the cultures developed in the Spanish and French languages have been receiving for centuries.²⁶

But let us suppose for a moment that this has come about and that those needing political protection now will have obtained it. We would then run into another matter requiring a solution: how should a hypothetical Basque state treat culture developed in Spanish and French? The fact is that all three cultural traditions are present in Euskal Herria, and it has already been suggested above that Basque pupils should leave school with a knowledge of both Basque and Spanish or French. In establishing something amounting to a national culture, inevitably the Basque state will need to acknowledge cultural productions in languages other than Basque *as well*, and so, one way or another, will be forced to search for a *new definition of Euskal Herria's national culture*. Let me be clear on this point: I do not believe there is such a thing as cultural 'neutrality' or universalism; but at the same time I do think that the schools should make a concerted effort to recognise and support the cultural characteristics of *all* Basque citizens. Many of the literary, artistic, musical and intellectual products of those other (non-Basque-language) cultural traditions form part and parcel of Basques' cultural heritage, and schools are obliged to teach and cultivate them in an appropriate manner, or else risk failing to achieve the integration that is the education system's aim. There is no other option for the Basque state and a democratic society. However, because it has been in a disadvantaged position for such a long time, Basque-medium culture deserves special support both in the officially stated curriculum and in

²⁵ In the case of Basque nationalism, for example, there is a conspicuous lack of attention to moral (and religious) matters in the schools (cf. Mateos & Zabalo, 2005). The nationalist Left's agnostic approach has led to the massive negligence of this area in school policies. In my opinion, this is illustrated by the practical lack of substantial content, in many schools, in the classes that are given as a substitute for the traditional (Roman Catholic) religion subject, even filling the time slot with crafts classes and so on (see Mateos, 2008).

²⁶ Needless to say, I share this opinion. Indeed this is the 'spirit' that brings the authors of this series together: the belief that it is necessary for Basque society to have its own state to address its needs.

extracurricular activities. A broad consensus on this might be sought across Basque society, and even if none were achieved the issue would still need to be addressed.

But that is not the only cultural issue that would need to be resolved (although it is the most important one) in present-day Basque society, because on top of this *old* cultural diversity a *new* diversity has been superimposed by waves of immigration from overseas in recent years. This has given responsible educators new things to worry about and given rise to a great number of opinions, concerns and proposals. Different orientations are present in these, yet on the whole they all agree on one point: that it is absolutely essential for political resources to be brought to bear in order for the school system to be capable of dealing adequately with the many issues arising from cultural diversity, of which the most often debated concern the language model to be applied to immigrant pupils and the policy of dispersing such pupils among the school centres and networks. The first of these is not so complicated in my opinion: immigrant pupils should receive the education prescribed by the government administration, and at the present time that means Basque-medium instruction. The second one is thornier. Briefly put, there is concern to avoid turning certain schools (public schools, principally) into immigrant ghettos, which has led to attempts to manage their numbers through a rationally planned distribution; while on the other hand, there is a desire to respect such pupils' wishes (the same as those of the parents of non-immigrant pupils) and avoid removing pupils from their own neighbourhood on account of immigrant student quotas.

Eventually, this cultural diversity (including religious differences) will no doubt bring to the surface other questions and a large-scale debate will need to ensue in Basque society over the place of foreign cultures in the schools; to put it another way, what kind of responsibility do the political authorities have in the preservation of cultures? There are already proposals circulating which, valuing cultural diversity positively and favouring the coexistence of diverse cultures, advocate a policy of *mutual recognition*. It has been suggested, for instance, that immigrant pupils should have to go to Basque-medium schools, but that in these schools a place should be made for their native language. In other words, immigrant groups must recognise that when they come to Euskal Herria they are coming into a society which has a particular culture and history, and Basque society must also acknowledge that the immigrant groups have a history, a past and a culture of their own. Mutual acquaintance and respect, then, should be maintained along multiculturalist lines (Albiste, 2008).

Obviously finding a solution is not easy. Even assuming everyone starts out from a position of proper, sincere respect for the cultural expressions of all individuals and groups, Basque schools will be hard pressed to give equal treatment to absolutely every culture, and unavoidably there will be some compulsory cultural choices to be made. The path towards integration of new immigrants will need to be traced out gradually, without undervaluing immigrants' cultural roots. However this comes about, it will clearly be necessary to promote a profound discussion in society about this issue, because a democratic Basque state has to achieve the compatibility of human rights, educational goals and a cultural policy. The role played by the education system in this respect will be a fundamental one, because the schools have the job, to a great extent, of putting this into practice.

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4. Citizenship within feminist theory and practice.

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This chapter examines some basic feminist critiques of the concept of citizenship, understanding feminism as a body of theory and practice in flux. It defends as a point of departure collective goals which should be taken on by a Basque state if it takes some of these critiques on board, both in public and private/domestic domains of life. It is proposed that a hypothetical Basque state should be oriented not only to commercial interests but to life in its entirety, developing a new way of understanding citizenship which takes account of both these domains, the public and the private, so that the production of individual rights would be associated with public and private activities: employment, politics, social life, culture, and domestic work and maintenance.

1. THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship has been put at the centre of a theoretical debate that is taking place in different disciplines such as philosophy, economics, politics and sociology. The debate involves a variety of issues including personal identity, the moral subject, political participation, the essence of the Welfare State, the implementation of human rights and the goals of social policies. Political theory provides a multitude of arguments that are useful for explaining this diversity in the use of the concept, including the crisis in Marxism and the appearance of liberal democracy as the only legitimate system of government (Garcia Guitian, 1999). Thus the basic core of political scientists' work is the analysis of democracy, and in this context the position of the Left is identified with a call for increased political participation, although this idea may take the form of different proposals. Hence discussions about the practical attributes of citizenship (who is a citizen and what are the citizen's rights) always presuppose a broad conceptualization of democracy. The difference between views about democracy would bring out the existing difference between those who maintain a pragmatic perspective when defining a democratic regime (based on models embodying a liberal morality) and those who prefer to endow it with a moral content (designing alternative models). Ways of understanding citizenship within the Western political tradition may also be reflected in this manifest difference: one which emphasises the participatory dimension, another which understands it as a legal status, to both of which some add moral principles: civic virtues, being a good citizen.

The success and institutionalisation of this legal conceptualisation and that of some participating dimensions have made it possible in modern liberal democracies to base its analysis and discussion upon a real context. The most widely accepted definition is T. H. Marshall's, proposed in 1949, according to which citizenship is a legal status which entitles people to civil, political and social rights. This has limited to a considerable extent the theoretical framework of the debate, making other theoretical issues evident such as those deriving from the crisis of the Welfare State and demands for political recognition: the kind of rights intrinsic to citizenship and their content. Thus the *new right* emphasises obligations, the individual responsibility to earn one's own living and the need to limit social rights. From more radical perspectives, the insufficiency of present-day rights is denounced: *feminists* call for reproductive rights to be recognised amid further development of social rights in order to achieve equal citizenship; while *pluralists* support the inclusion of specific and special cultural rights for certain groups.

Meanwhile, immigration, the creation of structures above the level of the state, the European Union, the radicalization of nationalist demands and perceptions of the globalisation process have led to a re-examination of the traditional limits of the political community of the nation-state. The equation of nationhood and citizenship is in crisis. A debate has opened over who are, and who should be, the members of the political community who make up the *demos* — citizens — and also what should be citizens' legal, political and social status in plural societies. Once again, the proposals vary according to the ideological perspective: liberals defend constitutional nationalism, while cultural pluralists call for differentiated citizenship and nationalists support citizenship with an integrating shared identity.

Whichever one's choice, the *concept of citizenship* always implies placing limits on the acquisition of membership in the political community comprising the *demos* and exclusion from that membership, and also some decisions about the rights, obligations and options associated with the status of the citizen.

2. THE FEMINIST VIEW OF CITIZENSHIP

The concept of citizenship, in setting limits and yielding rights, obligations and choices that have been fought for, cannot satisfy everyone. The polemical nature of citizenship is always dynamic, and is best understood as an ongoing debate over rights, obligations and choices. Understood in this way, feminist and gender research has contributions to make to the ongoing debate.

2.1. *Feminism as theory and practice in flux*

When talking about feminism in this article I will not take as my point of departure the ideas of different brands of feminism, but rather a *procedural definition of feminist practice* (Lombardo & Verloo, 2009). Feminist practice is understood in a specific way characterised both by different debates about the concepts of *gender, sex, domination and subordination relations* and the ongoing struggle over the multitude of critical views of gender equality. Ongoing struggle is the overriding concept of any feminist practice because it is *change*; thus feminist practice must of necessity be fed by the presence of struggles and irreconcilable positions. Feminist practice would be depolarized if one feminist position were to be imposed over others under the pretext of seeking unity. This analysis defines feminist practices on the basis of many types of feminism.

Basing the definition of feminism on this approach has two advantages:

- It avoids having to define the feminist political struggle a priori as a *women's common/shared identity*. This makes it unnecessary to link the partiality of feminist perspectives to an assumption of a universal subject, which is in the last resort just an expression of one partial position among others.
- Understanding feminism as under constant debate makes it easier to adapt to the constant transformation of the gender struggle and its strategies and agendas.

So, it seems logical to understand feminism as a theory and practice in flux.

The format of ongoing struggle results in feminist discourses questioning the assimilation processes of female or male rules of domination. Feminism not only criticises the assimilation of indisputable male rules but identifies oppositions within itself: it reveals the essentialism and homogenization processes of specific women's groups, and the exclusion of many other feminist approaches in the debate.

The theoretical format of feminist practices unites constructivist and deconstructivist views. The characteristics of the first view are the socially constructed nature of reality as contextualized and localized knowledge, and the interpretation of social construction as an invitation to action for change. Those of the second are an emphasis on the fragmentation and diversity of reality, and an insistence on the provisional character of truth; rejection of the dualistic hierarchy of Western philosophy and the search for objectivity and a single theory.

The feminist unification of both views makes possible the constant generation of partial knowledge in feminist debates, sometimes conflicting viewpoints, and these keep the movement and its practices going until new challenges and options appear. However, the standard ideal which considers the feminist subject to be plural and contradictory is very rarely put into practice, as we shall see below.

2.2. *Feminist debates*

Numerous feminist political debates take place concerning concepts, perspectives and strategies in the framework of an ongoing gender conflict.

The plurality of feminist traditions and approaches to the achievement of a society free from gender domination and oppression has resulted in the synthesis of three main views on gender equality, each of which raises different issues for politics to contend with, pointing towards different strategies.

First of all, *gender equality* may be conceptualised as a quest for equality in the sense of similarity; this goes together with an equal-opportunity strategy.

In the second place, *equality* can be conceptualised as the affirmation of a difference from men's rules; this view comes with an affirmative-action strategy, although it is not limited to that.

Lastly, *gender equality* may be seen as a transformation in all the established rules and routines that are (or ought to be) feminine *and* masculine; the strategy of preference for achieving such a transformation is gender mainstreaming.

From the *equality* viewpoint, the issue is that women have been excluded from the political domain, and the proposed solution is for women to enter that domain without questioning the underlying masculine rules.

The guiding idea of this strategy is to propose that every person should have access to the rights and opportunities of males regardless of their sex, and be treated according to identical principles, rules and standards. But this feminist tradition has received a great deal of criticism because it fails to question the prevalent patriarchal values directly.

The *differentiation* approach makes a social issue of a male norm which may not be disputed and women are required to follow (Mackinnon, 1987). It seeks to remake politics through recognition of women (as the non-hegemonic gender identity). This point of view goes together with radical and cultural feminism.

The *transformation* view which is supported by postmodern feminism puts the gendered world itself into question, not just the exclusion of women or the existence of a male standard. The proposed solution is to transcend the false *equality versus differentiation dilemma* through the deconstruction of the political discourses that create domination.

All three theoretical views regarding gender-equality have been institutionalized, and a variety of different political debates are taking place in the resulting framework. Rather than review all these debates, I will refer to those that may be considered fundamental for an understanding of *feminist citizenship*.

2.3. Gender and other differences

The notion of citizenship emerged on the basis of an idea of a socially constructed, universal human being. Women are made subjects of citizenship as if they were equal (Quesada, 2004), without taking into consideration other characteristics: race, class, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation, abilities and other complex differences. This homogenizing tendency has given rise to much discussion within feminism. Feminist theories mostly see gender as an organising principle of social reality and an analytical category; as a complex system at the centre of the social construction of relationships of power and domination where sexual roles are created and differentiated. Since the meaning given by a society to sexual inequality is constantly evolving, the concept of gender is open-ended but its essence is maintained in the socially constructed nature of sex relations and its close connection to power.

In practice, feminist theories focus on a primary structural difference, the primary character of which is disputed more and more. For the past two decades the main topic of debate has been how to incorporate gender into the context of the many differences between women. Black feminism has made a fundamental contribution to the debate on citizenship by alerting feminist academics to the risks of essentialism and homogenization within the feminist movement. New theories have been developed about the differences between women taking into account race, class, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation, abilities and other complex differences (Yuval Davis, 1991; Yuval Davis, 1997), showing that gender difference, in all its complexity, can only be understood in conjunction with these other differences. In the view of *political intersectionality* (Crenshaw, 1989), differences and their intersections are basic to political strategy. This concept suggests it is problematic to construct political differences in terms of a single dimension of difference because that single dimension is not neutral vis-à-vis the other dimensions. Thus the following questions arise: where and how is feminism discriminating against ethnic minorities or disabled women? where and how are measures against racism discriminating against women? where and how are gender-equality policies discriminating against lesbians? Although the concept of *political intersectionality* is widely used in academic circles, it has only barely started penetrating the formulation of actually policies (Lombardo eta Verloof, 2009). In the same vein, if one wishes to redefine the concept of citizenship to take a gender perspective into account, *how should this be done: as equal citizenship (the moral subject) or as differentiated citizenship?* Feminist theory cannot provide a single answer or a complete framework, but can only offer different proposals, which ultimately reflect different concepts of democracy; but underlying the approach to the form of participation, representation or specific social and cultural rights there is a single general perspective. Some examples of this are Benhabib's deliberative democracy, Okin's Rawlsian liberalism, Mouffe's radical pluralist democracy, Young's communicative democracy or the position of radical postmodernism, which is: make no proposals (Benhabib, 1996; Okin, 1994; Mouffe, 1996; Young, 1997). All these authors have taken changes inspired by a gender perspective as their starting point, because multiple projects do not weaken the feminist struggle, on the contrary they enrich it. Neither need such pluralism obstruct political campaigns. Besides constructing alternative models which may some day come about or at least be of use to transform the status quo, there is another area of study: the present-day situation and how to advance from it. Just as theorists make different proposals for models of democracy, there is something that links these feminists: criticism of the structures and processes of present democratic regimes for excluding women or subordinating them to men. Critical theory has made it possible to prove that citizenship discriminates against women, and has made proposals for change without necessarily agreeing with a fully defined alternative project. As regards citizenship, proposals for transformation through gender analysis chiefly focus on issues raised by a rethinking of the traditional classification of public and private domains.

2.4. Defining politics: the dichotomy between public and private domains

The gender system affects all social relationships, and naturally political ones too. The *public-private dichotomy* invented by liberal patriarchal ideology has characterized and delimited the modern political domain. This dichotomy sees society as divided into two hierarchical domains, the *public domain assigned to men* and the *private domain associated with women*; the first of these has higher status, a power quota and more material resources. Modern politics is part of the public domain, and participating in it is considered a man's job. Most definitions of social and political participation refer to the public, political domain, and since until recently women were excluded from the public domain, their social and political role is invisible in our society. Today this dichotomy has come under debate in both political theory and political sociology, with critical contributions developed within feminist theory playing an important part in the discussion. These contributions transcend the observation of the public-private dichotomy to posit a

new definition of social and political participation in which participation is open to the whole community rather than only to one part of it.

In the whole social system, the understanding about the reality behind the participation proposal is not just split into two separate domains but take a more complex form. We would add a third domain, the *domestic*, which is quite distinct from the private domain. 'Private' refers to one's own personal space and time, within which decisions one can make desicions; this is a positive value, in order to isolate oneself from the outer world to attain well-being in *privacy*: that is *men's privacy*. But there is a second form of privacy which is concerned less with *oneself* than with *others*, with the family at home, and involved with the needs created by the family. This amounts not so much to being with oneself as to being with others; it is a state of service. This is *women's privacy*, and it is accorded no value. Domesticity signifies giving up one's own personal space and time for the sake of other people (Murillo, 1996).

When the liberal public-private dichotomy talks about civil society it does not take domestic life into account, so social theories ignore women's experience and everything relating to daily life. This despite the fact that work (not employment), personal relations, care of the young, sick and elderly, and everyday life are all essential for the public and private domains to function. The domestic domain is related not only to the public-private but also to the public-domestic; first of all, because a great many personal circumstances such as laws of the family, employment, abortion etc. are regulated and governed in the public domain. And secondly, because the family performs the social functions of life's *social reproduction*, which are necessary for survival: socialization processes and caring, including everything relating to the body as the natural basis of life.

Another component of the public-private dichotomy is *time*. In advanced societies, time which can be turned into money has value: this is public time. However, feminism has shown that there is another time, subject to economics, hegemony and power, not included in public time: *reproduction time*. This encompasses many uses of time that are essential for life to proceed: caring, giving affection, maintenance, managing and administering the home, relationships, leisure activities. This time is not counted or remunerated, it is living-time, given and created, immeasurable, ruled by human subjectivity; all these things are related to human desires concerning the organisation and relationships of life, and the desires which give life meaning (Carrasco, 2006; Zabala & Luxan, 2009).

Overlooking the qualitative aspects of time leads to ignoring and downplaying women's experience relating to the life cycle. In such daily experience, where time that is not public is invisible, arise the biggest managerial issues, for women at any rate. This management goes beyond the structuring of time to cover caring, affection, emotions, networks, employment and work, leisure time, participation and much more; it is a responsibility that is not easily classified into separate compartments.

The above ideas show up the excluding nature of the male model of participation which requires time and freedom of action to participate in the market and in public life, but does not include time for looking after people. But that participation makes it necessary for there to be another person — a woman — to satisfy the needs of those living in the home, including those of the males who are taking part in the market and public life. Thus the political domain and citizenship recreate and maintain gender differences just as other structures, work and intimacy, do; in all cases, the public-private dichotomy stands in the centre. The separation of work and intimacy recreates the public-private dichotomy, because the distinction between work and caring, or between paid work and unpaid work, is based on a male-female hierarchy which rests on the subordination of women to men. The traditional male and female roles or the acceptance of heterosexual complementarity

pervade the organisation of private life and relations with children. Citizenship does not recognise the private and domestic domains, hence it is restrictive. For citizenship to be universal (with equal rights for all), it must refer to undifferentiated individuals, independently of their ideology, class, race, ethnic group, gender, family, age, life cycle and so on. Good citizens are asked to forget their private loyalties, bonds and interests, yet these are the very loyalties upon which they have built their personal individuality. This contradiction expresses the opposition between the public and the private: the public is political, it is the domain of universal rights and characteristics, whereas the private is mainly the domain of the family, diversity and the particular. Conceiving of citizenship as exclusively public has resulted in the linking of the production of individual rights to public activities: employment, politics, social and cultural life.

The debate over the division between the public and private domains certainly continues to hold centre-stage in feminist practice. There is a huge vacuum in the formulations of political practices and policies: some things are considered private, while others have been regulated by the state for centuries, including gender identities, sexual identities, love and sex. The state has itself played a part in the perpetuation of gender differences. But at the same time it has to be admitted that the Welfare State, in practice if not in principle, has modified the division between the public and the private. The existence of social rights has moved private life into the domain of politics, hence of public life, even if this practical change has not led to a redefinition of politics, which maintains an odd sort of duality in this respect: it recognises social rights but does not attribute to them the same status as political rights. The beneficiaries of these rights, such as women, are treated as if they had an inferior status. These rights are viewed not as forming part of citizenship directly but as “fringe” issues.

The gender system has been responsible for the extreme difference between the public and private. Silence still surrounds the private domain even when the public voices have changed and although the change calls for a reconceptualization. The content and characteristics of the public and the private, their institutions and activities have evolved over time, *but politics has never defined itself as the place for establishing the collective goals coming from both domains*. Public politics and its expression have always been the public voice. Public voice, private silence. This nature of politics has had important consequences for collective social goals or the agents for achieving them: it excludes women, and social projects deriving from private activity too. However, although women have experienced first exclusion and later limited admission to citizenship, there have always been ways for them to make demands and contribute to political projects. Feminism has been one expression of those demands, but women have often participated in political organisations and institutions (Astelarra, 2005).

2.5. Feminism transforming the state: equality policies, representation and political presence

The nineteenth-century nation-state legitimised the separation of public and private life. Legislation and official policies reinforced it, and the courts perpetuated the established order. Many women rebelled against this situation and started the women's suffrage movement; but they had to wait until after the First World War to achieve the right to vote. Following the World War II, the women's suffrage spread to most western countries. Although the international suffrage movement managed to eliminate those legal restrictions, discrimination against women continued by indirect means. Not only did the state continue to assign to women the functions of looking after the family and the home, but it refused to recognise their authority in the family: that position belonged to the father, or the oldest male. Again, the Welfare State has in practice modified the division between public and private domains, with most of its services taking place between the state and the family, the ultimate recipient of most of them being the family. Nevertheless, those

practical changes did not lead to a status change for women because the state carried on considering women's role to be in the family, which makes them a different kind of citizen; social rights were not linked to individual rights, as were political rights, because the latter were associated with people who had employment in the labour market: hence, with men; other family members who did not earn a salary were under their charge. This situation put women at a disadvantage.

The right to vote did make women citizens, but it didn't lead to equality between women and men. To eliminate this inequality, it was necessary for women to participate in public life, not only because the inequality was derived from a system created by men but because public policies were recreating and maintaining the difference.

The social atmosphere created by the feminist movement, which started in the nineteen-sixties²⁷ and grew over the following decades, helped to modify the discriminatory behaviour of the state. Various strategies have been (and still are being) tried out to correct and eliminate the unequal treatment of and discrimination against women: these are equal opportunities, affirmative action and mainstreaming.²⁸

An equal-opportunity policy is one that aims to incorporate women into public life. Once women had been recognised to have the same rights as men, these rights of women needed to be backed by measures to ensure that women could avail themselves of their rights by removing legal, economical, social, cultural and power-related barriers. One of the most important tools making it possible for women to enjoy the same opportunities is education, both formal and cultural. The objective is for women to realise that they have individual rights which they can assert in the job market, politics and social life. Together with such cultural training, women also needed to acquire training in job skills through higher education. Thus education policies are one of the main means for implementing an equal-opportunity strategy. But the creation of awareness among women is not sufficient: another part of the strategy is to bring about structural changes. Legislation has been a major structural component, because it is important for the law to establish legal equality. The first step is to review current legislation, because even though women now have the vote many inequalities remain embedded in current legislation. Once discriminatory laws are eliminated, new laws have to be created to promote equality: laws dealing with violence, employment, laws that make the pursuit of family life and a professional career compatible, and laws about participation in political institutions. But new laws do not change the part women play in society. An examination of these policies shows that women and men do not stand in the same condition when it comes to taking an active role in public life.

Although equal opportunity strategies have produced many good results, it has remained difficult for women to enter the public domain, one of the main problems being the organisation of society which continues to discriminate against women, particularly women's role in the family. That is not the only problem because women also suffer discrimination within the public domain itself. The movement's response to these difficulties and limitations is to point out that if women do not have equality at the starting point and on that account find it harder to take part in public life, then the starting point has to be put right. At the same time, it must be made possible for women to attain the same positions as men in the public arena, the job market, politics and society. Affirmative action and the women's empowerment are the best strategies for overcoming the obstacles brought to light by equal opportunity approaches.

²⁷ Namely the second wave of the Feminist Movement.

²⁸ These were presented and analysed in the section titled "Feminist debates".

Affirmative action encourages participatory policies to compensate for the obstacles to women's presence in public life by giving priority to women over men as the subjects of inequality in equal conditions. There are many ways to apply the principle of affirmative action, such as the quota system, which aims to balance the numerical proportion between men and women in certain activities, for example to support the presence of women in politics. Women's empowerment works the same way, by securing a larger quota of power for women.

Some empowerment strategies are akin to affirmative action because giving women equal opportunities does not suffice to abolish discrimination. Power is of course one of the main components in relationships between women and men, to confront which it is necessary both for women to gain more self-esteem and confidence in their own abilities, and to wield power in their personal and public lives.

Although affirmative action has been an essential part of equal opportunity in order to overcome some of the latter's limitations, its implementation has not done away with discrimination either, because it has not resolved the underlying problem, which is that the presence of women in public life has not resulted in a change in the housewife's role. In women's life, doing double work has become the norm.

To develop public strategies to end discrimination against women, it is necessary to change the conceptual framework behind those strategies. New categories are needed to analyse the basis of women's inequality, and for that it is necessary to recognise the gender system, and not only in public life. The basic point of this new conceptual framework is the proposal to modify all the imposed feminine and masculine rules and routines in order to make *gender equality* available, preferably through strategies of mainstreaming and parity.

Initially, gender mainstreaming called for a broadening of the domain of participation of equal opportunity policies, so that they covered the whole of the state, through greater political compromise to end discrimination and more involvement of resources and institutions. Its core strategy has been to include the gender dimension in different public activities, each of which is analysed to see whether there is a difference in its impact on female and male groups. Although mainstreaming is broader than the other strategies, it does not replace them, but rather each complements the other.

Parity is also seen as affirmative action to ensure that both genders are equally represented in all activities, but particularly in political positions and posts. Parity consists of the application of quota policies so that neither gender has more than 60% representation, so there is a maximum 60-40 proportion. The objective is recognition of legal subjects of both sexes thanks to social action, surmounting the limits of formal equality between men and women, and ensuring true equality in all domains. The inclusion of sexual identity in the definition of a legal person would entail the same status for women as for men. This is parity.

As regards citizenship, representation has been considered in both directions in all three strategies. As was hinted in the above descriptions, there have been demands for the presence of women in traditional domains of institutional representation, meetings, administrative and executive bodies, on the assumption that their presence in the political elites would lead to the appearance of new subjects on the political agenda and have an influence on policies. It was also expected to achieve representation of a broader kind, not just increasing the number of participants but broadening the places and manners in which that participation occurred. Besides calling for the non-formal modes of participation which appear to be more accessible to women (Amurrio et al., 2007b: 39-41), support for broader participation would be connected to a proposal, relevant to modification of job distributions along sex lines, for social and political participation to be open to the whole community.

All the political strategies and measures mentioned have been widely implemented in the Basque Country, although the country's administrative fragmentation has exerted its influence here too. Thus in southern Euskal Herria, the model used in the Spanish state has been maintained, so that in the nineteen-eighties, in each autonomous community official organisms were created which were affiliated to the Woman's Institute (a Spanish organism necessary to channel policies of gender equality): these were the Basque Woman's Institute (or Emakunde) in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), and the Navarre Equality Institute in Navarre.²⁹ The capacity for action of these institutes has been proportional to the degree of legitimacy attained in the respective autonomous community administrations; thus while the Basque Woman's Institute is currently implementing its Fifth Equality Plan, The Navarre Equality Institute only completed its first Equal Opportunity Plan (for 2006-2010) barely a year ago.³⁰ (It is also worth noting that the Basque Autonomous Community adopted the Law of Equality Between Women and Men three years earlier than the Spanish state.) Thus the Basque Woman's Institute seems to have achieved broader legitimacy than the Navarrese institute. The time lag between the two administrations is also evident in the following statistics.

Accessibility of the public domain: affirmative action

Percentages of female town councillors

Until:	1995	2002	2011
Navarre	17.2	21.1	27.74
BAC	21.4	26.6	35.05

Sources: Astelarra, 2005: 378, <www.mujiereenred.net>.

Percentages of female members of autonomous communities' parliaments

Until:	1998/1999	2011
Navarre	26	34
BAC (1998)	30.7	45*

Sources: Astelarra, 2005: 374, <www.mujiereenred.net>.

And from the equality officers of the local government network Berdinsare, which was created in the Basque Autonomous Community to facilitate coordination and cooperation among these officers, has come a broad organisation of local training courses.

It is not the purpose of this article to recount over twenty years of activity, so I will limit myself to a few facts in order to show what progress towards equality has been made so far in some Basque towns, with good results in certain cases and more dubious ones in others.³¹ The way has been led by insitutional feminism in consultation with women's and feminist groups in the cases where this was possible.

As I have shown, feminist analysis of citizenship leads to an analysis of policy and the activity of the state; some initiatives deriving from such ideas have been carried out in these domains, and I have tried to go some way towards showing that although feminist practices have achieved some good things in the course of the quest for equality between men and women, one major obstacle comes up time and time again: the division of work that underpins the way society is organised, so that the place where least has changed is the area in which women's presence is the greatest, namely the domestic domain. Despite

²⁹ Called in Spanish the *Instituto Navarro para la Igualdad y la Familia*, formerly *Instituto Navarro de la Mujer*: see <www.navarra.es> viewed on the 1st of April, 2012.

³⁰ <<http://www.navarra.es>> viewed on the 1st of April, 2012; <<http://www.emakunde.euskadi.net>> viewed on the 1st of April, 2012. * Parekotasunaren helburua lortua.

³¹ Note that some important elements of the Law of Equality Between Women and Men have yet to be developed and implemented.

the fact that the tasks performed in this domain are basic to life, they are still 'valueless' tasks in our society, as is the time spent on them, because women's time is unquantifiable. These activities are not reflected in public citizenship, while in these pages I have put forward the idea that a different kind of citizenship, one which does not exclude women, is possible, provided a policy can be created which brings together public and private voices through a process backed by the state.

Today when a broad wave of Basque national sentiment is clamouring for a Basque state in Euskal Herria, an interesting process of reflection is getting under way regarding the nature of such a political structure, and feminists are eager to participate in this process using all the tools that feminism has developed, in the conviction that this will be beneficial for all of Basque society.

2.6. The opportunity to join public voices and private voices in Euskal Herria

At a time when a broad social and political sector of Basque society has embarked on a process of reflection about the significance of a hypothetical Basque state, the feminist perspective is able not only to point out how gender relations can affect the process but to make proposals about existing gender inequalities. Let us therefore participate in these reflections.

The extent of Basque national sentiment underlines the need for a Basque state. There is talk of a widespread sentiment, and this is of prime importance for the growing national project, so the idea is for this project to have a heavy component of participation and integration so that the national sentiment will spread even more in Basque society. In the debate over what the national project will consist of, it may be suspected that the participation in it of women and men will be unequal, and that what women say about it will be taken less into account than what men have to say on the matter (Walby, 1992). Thus gender relations can be expected to have a big impact on what will be decided about the national project. Women's interests may be either absent or poorly expressed in the national project, and this could diminish support for the project on the part of women. If so, an opportunity to achieve a sentiment giving even wider support to the national project would have been lost. Two issues need to be resolved so that this is not allowed to happen: one is the issue of unequal participation of women and men; the other, that of women's opinions not being heeded. The solution to the first of these is easy: women's and men's participation in the debate should be balanced; for that to happen, the obstacles preventing women from taking part need to be removed so that their double work load does not turn into a triple one. The second issue can be addressed by turning things around and listening to women's concerns and proposals. To a large extent, both solutions require a *change in political culture and power relationships*; if achieved, we would have a national project based on relationships of equality, and by presenting a national project with the added value of equality in Basque society there would be a better chance to win wider support for the project.

A more widespread sentiment of Basque nationhood created by a national project based on relations of equality should incorporate into the future state, from both public and private (including domestic) domains, collective goals arising from both, thus orienting a hypothetical Basque state not just towards the market but to life as a whole. Such a state would give rise to a new concept of citizenship which took into account the two domains, the public and the private, and so would be linked to the production of individual rights in public and private activities: employment, politics, social life, culture, housework and caring. The benefits of individual rights would thus extend to the entire population.

All these changes would redefine the domain of politics as a domain for establishing collective objectives from public and private life. But it is one thing to establish objectives and quite another to achieve them. For the latter purpose, the Basque state will need to work together with Basque society, since many of those collective objectives require changes in social structure, including relationships within the family, intimate relationships, work relationships and so on. Legislation and gender policies are useful tools, but they are not enough, so the Basque state would be unable to achieve these objectives without the support of Basque society; therefore, to keep the channels open and working between the Basque state and Basque society, the state will have to take the local councils and social movements into account as well.

Basque society is modern, advanced, pluralistic and culturally diverse, and as whatever the components of a definition of citizenship, somebody will always be unhappy. This polemical aspect of citizenship is always dynamic, and is best understood in terms of an ongoing debate concerning rights, obligations and choices. Feminism is also characterised and permeated by these debates, within which it creates new concepts still at a normative level, now being circulated in academia, but which may some day be able to make interesting contributions to the debate, provided the idea of *political intersectionality* is put into practice. It must not be forgotten that the political category of women is blind to other possible inequalities among women such as race, class, ethnic group, age, sexual orientation and so on. Thinking about Basque citizenship should also take note of these inequalities, and indeed may find the theoretical tools developed by feminism useful for the purpose.

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Has the right time come for the creation of a Basque state? If so, why; what would the state of Euskal Herria be like; how would it be constituted; and what do we need to know and understand to be able to address these questions? Towards a Basque state brings together articles by specialists in a wide range of disciplines aiming to help us understand these issues from different vantage points. Together, they speak to many theoretical and practical points, offer keys to a deeper comprehension of the ideological debate, equip us with relevant information and analyses, and go a long way towards transforming the question of Basque sovereignty from an abstract demand into a real, tangible idea, mapped out and given real content. These pages contain arguments which suggest not just that Euskal Herria today possesses the necessary conditions and has the potential to become a successful state ready to take up its place among the nations of Europe, but equally importantly, that this is a development from which every individual who lives and works in the Basque Country stands to benefit.

